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a b s t r a c t 
We investigate the impact on social welfare of the United Kingdom (UK) policy introduced in 1980 by 
which public housing tenants (council housing in UK parlance) had the right to purchase their houses at 
heavily discounted prices. This was known as the Right to Buy (RTB) policy. Although this internationally- 
unique policy was the largest source of public privatization revenue in the UK and raised home owner- 
ship as a share of housing tenure by around 15%, the policy has been little analyzed by economists. We 
investigate the equilibrium housing policy of the public authority in terms of quality and quantity of 
publicly-provided housing both in the absence and presence of a RTB policy. We ﬁnd that RTB can im- 
prove the aggregate welfare of low-income households only if the council housing quality is sufficiently 
low such that middle-wealth households have no incentive to exercise RTB. We also explore the welfare 
effects of various adjustments to the policy, in particular (i) to reduce discounts on RTB sales; (ii) to 
loosen restrictions on resale; (iii) to return the proceeds from RTB sales to local authorities to construct 
new public properties; and (iv) to replace RTB with rent subsidies in cash. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
1. Introduction 
This paper undertakes what we believe to be the ﬁrst wel- 
fare analysis of the Right to Buy (RTB) policy for publicly-owned 
housing that was developed in the late 1970s in the United King- 
dom (UK) and became a ﬂagship policy of the Thatcher govern- 
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ment. RTB allowed tenants in publicly-owned council housing to 
buy their rented accommodation at a heavily subsidized price (al- 
beit with subsidies that varied both over time and geographically 
across local jurisdictions). Overall, RTB was largely responsible for 
an increase in the share of home ownership among household- 
ers in the UK from 55% in 1979 to over 70% in the early 20 0 0s, 
thereby inducing a large-scale change in asset ownership among 
UK households in a relatively short period. Despite being an inno- 
vative and internationally-unique policy, RTB has been little ana- 
lyzed by economists in Britain and elsewhere. 
In the paper we examine the incentives implied by the RTB pol- 
icy in the context of a model of heterogeneous households choos- 
ing between private ownership, private renting, and public rent- 
ing. We describe the policy background to the provision of public 
housing in the UK and the development of the RTB policy in the 
remainder of Section 1 . The remaining sections of the paper con- 
struct a theoretical argument on RTB which reﬂects these stylized 
historical facts, a brief description of which is as follows. 
Household heterogeneity arises because households have differ- 
ent prospective life-cycle wealth proﬁles and, within any period, 
differing probabilities of high income ‘draws’. Given the signiﬁcant 
ﬁxed cost of purchasing a house, a household needs sufficient high 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2017.01.005 
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income ‘draws’ to be in a position to purchase. 1 Moreover, the de- 
mand for housing units (in terms of quantity and quality) is in- 
creasing in income and wealth. Hence the supply of private hous- 
ing reﬂects the ﬁnancial position and preferences of households 
with more frequent high income ‘draws’. Since, in the long run, 
private rents must reﬂect the annuitized price of private housing 
units, the private rental market also caters for the preferences of 
the same segment of households ( Section 2.1 ). 
The rationale for public sector housing is that it supplies lower 
quality units of housing that may not be provided by the private 
sector. These can be rented by households with few high income 
‘draws’, so long as public housing is provided at similar cost-per- 
unit for given quality to private housing. We show evidence that 
public housing in the UK is indeed of lower quality but can ﬁnd 
no robust evidence of the public cost inefficiencies frequently de- 
scribed in the literature in the United States. Indeed, since lo- 
cal authorities are budget-constrained, constructing higher quality 
units would lead to greater demand for public housing and hence 
rationing (queueing). We derive an equilibrium quality of public 
housing which reﬂects this trade-off ( Section 2.2 ). 
The ‘Right to Buy’ (RTB) policy, by subsidizing purchase price 
and reducing ﬁxed costs of purchase (e.g. by allowing higher loan- 
to-value ratios and cheaper credit terms), allows households with 
fewer high income ‘draws’ to purchase their public housing. But 
not every household which is eligible for RTB will necessarily pur- 
chase because public housing rents are subsidized and mainte- 
nance costs are generally borne by the public authority. A house- 
hold considering RTB will trade-off these costs against their prefer- 
ence (if any) for home ownership over renting. Over time, two key 
effects of the RTB policy are to reduce the stock of public housing 
relative to private housing, but also to change the distribution of 
‘quality’ of housing units within the private sector ( Section 3 ). In 
Section 3.1 we provide some new empirical evidence on the distri- 
bution of housing units and also on the characteristics of council 
tenants and of those who opt to purchase their public housing un- 
der the ‘’Right to Buy’ policy. 
In Section 4 , we examine various reforms to the RTB program, 
including changing the discount rate on RTB sales ( Section 4.1 ), 
loosening resale restrictions on housing purchased through RTB 
( Section 4.2 ), permitting local public authorities to retain receipts 
from RTB sales in order to construct new public housing of a par- 
ticular quality ( Section 4.3 ), and ﬁnally, replacing public housing 
with cash subsidies ( Section 4.4 ). Section 5 provides a brief con- 
clusion to the paper. 2 
1.1. Background: council housing and the development of Right to 
Buy 
‘Council housing’ (the term for public housing constructed by 
local government authorities in the UK) was a policy developed 
from the early 1920s onwards in order to re-house low income 
families in subsidized, rented, accommodation. The need to re- 
house families arose from an ongoing policy of slum clearance in 
1 We do not explicitly discuss the argument that individuals with more in- 
come volatility, for given expected wealth, would prefer to rent rather than buy 
( Ioannides, 1979; Rosen et al., 1984 ) - a result which ﬁnds some empirical support 
in Robst et al. (1999) . Among a number of subsequent contributions, Ortalo-Magne 
and Rady (2002) argue that the standard result hinges on the nature of the covari- 
ance between income and asset price volatility. 
2 Although we discuss the redistributional implications of the RTB program, we 
do not explicitly examine public housing policy as an additional instrument for re- 
distribution, providing in-kind rather than cash transfers, other than our brief dis- 
cussion in Section 4.4 . This argument for public housing is highly controversial in 
the United States though it provides an additional rationale for the development of 
public housing in the UK, at least until the 1950s. For further discussion in the con- 
text of housing, see Aaron and Von Furstenberg (1971) ; Thurow (1984) and Bruce 
and Waldman (1991) . 
the 1920s and 1930s coupled with a perceived shortage of afford- 
able private rented housing; a need heightened from the 1940s on- 
wards because 4 million houses in the UK were seriously damaged 
or destroyed by bombing between 1939 and 1945. Aided by the 
1946 Land Acquisitions Act, which allowed local authorities to ac- 
quire land for construction, and by direct subsidies from central 
government, council house construction accelerated after 1945 and 
continued well into the 1970s. By 1979 around 32% of dwellings in 
Britain were council houses, totalling some 6.5 million properties 
– a far greater share of the total housing stock than that of public 
housing in, for example, the United States. 3 
It is reasonable to ask – at least from a North American view- 
point – why increased provision of public housing, rather than en- 
couragement of private ownership and construction, played such a 
dominant role in UK housing policy for such a long period. But it 
should be remembered that the UK, over the century beginning in 
the late 1910s, moved from a nation of private renters to one of 
private owners as well as public renters. Chart 1 shows how, be- 
tween 1918 and 1991, the share of private renting fell from 76% of 
housing tenures to only 9% of housing tenures. And Chart 2 shows 
that, although there were periods in which public housing con- 
struction matched or indeed exceeded private construction (such 
as the decade after 1945), in other periods – notably the 1930s 
and 1960s - private construction for homeowners dominated pub- 
lic construction by local public authorities. The important role of 
public construction (at least, relative to North America) seems to 
have stemmed from several factors: borrowing constraints both on 
the one hand on private builders and landlords seeking to ren- 
ovate properties in the 1920s but also on working class tenants 
seeking to buy their own houses; a shortage of private land and a 
high degree of public regulation of planned private housebuilding 
through much of the 1940s and early 1950s; the ideology of ‘mu- 
nicipal socialism’ which reappeared in the UK at regular intervals 
between the 1880s and 1940s; and (given the large share of public 
housing) the apparent absence of the stigma and social externali- 
ties associated with public housing in the United States. Neverthe- 
less, it is perhaps surprising to housing economists that, even in 
the late 1950s, the number of housing units constructed for local 
public authorities still exceeded the number of private dwellings 
constructed in the UK. 
Because of the capacity of public authorities to construct rel- 
atively cheap lower quality housing units, council housing in the 
UK has been generally regarded as a solution to the major social 
problem of a shortage of affordable housing. Council housing is 
normally allocated to families by a simple queueing mechanism 
with priority given to families with special housing needs (home- 
lessness, state of existing accommodation, severe health problems, 
eviction unrelated to personal behavior, etc.) but also more gen- 
erally to those with low incomes and/or proxies for low income 
such as family size and employment status (or lack of it). For those 
without priority needs, waiting times could be as long as several 
years or indeed indeﬁnite, although in the heyday of council hous- 
ing a local authority could usually offer a property of some kind 
within a shorter period. For tenants, the attractiveness of coun- 
cil housing is that rents are usually signiﬁcantly lower than those 
for equivalent private sector rental properties, and indeed private 
rentals had become increasingly scarce by the end of the 1970s. 
Maintenance costs of council housing are in general covered by lo- 
cal authorities. These implicit subsidies were in part made possible 
by direct subsidies for construction from central government (in- 
cluding allowing local authorities to borrow at lower interest rates 
than private housebuilders) and by the development of low-cost 
system construction methods which, however, subsequently some- 
3 Jones and Murie (2006) Table 2.2. and p.52. 
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times led to higher maintenance costs falling on the local authori- 
ties. 
However, the policy also had obvious costs, which became more 
apparent over time and especially in the late 1950s. Rents were 
subsidized but did not cover the full economic cost, hence local 
authorities bore a burden that was only partly subsidized by block 
grants from central authorities. Excess demand for council hous- 
ing prevailed. Families who got on a council house waiting list had 
no incentive to remove themselves from that list; indeed, even if a 
family’s economic conditions improved, there was no incentive to 
exit the council house sector at all. This, it was suggested, reduced 
the ﬂexibility of the labor market (e.g. Hughes and McCormick, 
1981 ). As the criteria for council house priority shifted from slum 
clearance and rehousing to family ‘need’, there were strong incen- 
tives for families to assume the characteristics (lack of job, large 
number of children, partnership dissolution) that increased eligibil- 
ity. Finally, there was a belated recognition that a socially-optimal 
housing policy might move away from a distortion of demand to- 
wards public renting in favor of an increase in private provision –
both in the form of private ownership and private renting. These 
had, to a large extent, been constrained by a mixture of borrowing 
constraints (both on would-be purchasers and housebuilders), rent 
controls, planning regulations, and ideological perceptions. 
Hence, as real incomes increased, the need for constructing 
further council houses seemed less clear-cut. Although signiﬁcant 
council-house construction continued into the late 1970s, the pro- 
gram peaked in the early 1950s. A succession of Conservative gov- 
ernments began to emphasize home ownership as a means of 
distributing wealth more widely. Mortgage interest relief was in- 
troduced in 1969 (ironically, by a Labour government). Some lo- 
cal Conservative councils began to see their council housing stock 
both as a burden on local property taxpayers (subsidized rents and 
maintenance costs) but also as a potential means of widening as- 
set ownership in their local communities with the potential for ex- 
ternalities arising from a better social mix of residents. There was 
strong pressure on national government from these local authori- 
ties to permit a policy of subsidized selling of the existing council 
housing stock (albeit with equal resistance from some parts of the 
Labour Party and from the architects of post-war housing policy). It 
was the arrival of the Conservative central government under Mar- 
garet Thatcher in 1979 with a large parliamentary majority, how- 
ever, that provided the key impetus for a national RTB policy. 
1.2. Evolution of Right to Buy 
The Housing Act of 1980 introduced a statutory Right to Buy 
(RTB) for council tenants with at least three years’ tenure in their 
council houses – ‘statutory’ in the sense that the policy should be 
implemented by all local authorities instead of voluntarily by a few 
Conservative councils. Discounts on the sale price relative to the 
assessed market value of a property ranged from 33% for council 
tenants with three years’ residence through to a maximum of 50% 
after twenty years’ residence. Local authorities were also required 
to make mortgages available to would-be purchasers albeit subject 
to standard age limits and income multiples. The discount would 
be repayable if the property was sold within ﬁve years of a RTB 
purchase and there was a ﬂoor price such that recently constructed 
properties should not be sold at less than the cost of construction. 
Subsequent legislation in the 1980s relaxed the conditions still fur- 
ther – for example by increasing the discounts for would-be pur- 
chasers of apartments and relaxing the cost ﬂoor condition. 
Chart 3 shows clear peaks in council-house sales arising from 
the 1980 Act and the liberalization of eligibility conditions and in- 
creased discounts in the mid-1980s. New council-house construc- 
tion almost disappeared after the introduction of RTB although 
construction of other forms of social (i.e. not-for-proﬁt) housing 
(around 20,0 0 0 new units a year) continued. Although sales were 
at a lower level after these spikes associated with policy changes 
and the general decumulation of the council housing stock (espe- 
cially the better quality housing), sales continued into the mid- 
20 0 0s at a signiﬁcant level for two reasons. First, new tenants be- 
came eligible by attaining residency requirements and took advan- 
tage of low mortgage rates through much of the period. Second, 
residual opposition from some Labour councils impeded the pro- 
cess and speed of sales in some localities, for example by evading 
statutory requirements by handing their housing stock over to so- 
cial housing association where conditions for sale were consider- 
ably stricter until these too were liberalized in the early 20 0 0s –
hence the further upsurge in sales in the mid-20 0 0s. 
By the mid-20 0 0s, around 2.8 million council houses had been 
sold in the UK, mostly under RTB. These sales comprised around 
half the total stock that had existing at the start of the policy 
( Jones and Murie, 2006 ). Who were the gainers and losers from 
the policy? 
There were two clear groups of winners from the policy. The 
ﬁrst group were obviously ex-council tenants who had been able 
to purchase relatively desirable properties at heavily discounted 
prices. By exercising RTB, however, they became responsible for 
their mortgage ﬁnance and for the maintenance and upkeep of 
their properties; moreover, the resale restrictions mean that, if a 
purchaser was no longer in a position to pay off the mortgage, he 
or she was at risk of foreclosure. As we will discuss shortly, this 
is a nontrivial potential cost given the likelihood that many ex- 
council tenants had relatively low incomes. 
The second group of gainers from the RTB policy were tax- 
payers in general, via central government, because the bulk of re- 
ceipts from council-house sales was offset by a reduction in central 
grants to local authorities - that is, receipts were mostly effectively 
transferred to the central government. After 1990, local authorities 
normally had access to only 25% of the capital receipts with the 
remaining 75% treated as ‘reserved receipts’ which could not be 
utilized for replacement of the council housing stock. Indeed, even 
the retained 25% of receipts could be used for maintenance and 
renovation of the existing stock rather than construction of new 
council houses. The sales of council houses were the ‘largest pri- 
vatization’ undertaken in the UK in this period in terms of raising 
revenue for the central government, exceeding the proceeds from 
sales of any other major public utilities in the same period ( House 
of Commons, 1999 , p.11). 
There were two groups of potential losers from the policy. First 
were local authorities. Although the RTB program reduced the 
need of covering maintenance costs and subsidizing rents, local au- 
thorities had received little of the receipts from sales and still had 
a statutory duty to rehouse the homeless and those with press- 
ing housing needs. Malpass and Murie (1999) point out that subsi- 
dies paid by local authorities to cover council tenants had fallen in 
nominal terms from £2.1 billion in 1980 to £1.2 billion in 1990 –
a clear saving to local authorities. However, as these authors state, 
the number of applicants for council housing arising from home- 
lessness more than doubled over the same period, from 63,0 0 0 to 
146,0 0 0. This partly reﬂected the continued decline of the private 
rental market over the longer period (see Chart 1). By being forced 
to house homeless families in unsuitable or more expensive hous- 
ing (e.g. private tenancies or even hotels), the savings to local au- 
thorities from lower maintenance costs and subsidized rentals aris- 
ing from RTB were steadily eroded over time as the stock of rental 
properties – both public and private – shrank. 
The second potential group of losers were subsequent gen- 
erations of would-be council tenants who, not being priority 
claimants, and in the face of a shrinking stock of council houses, 
faced longer and possibly indeﬁnite waiting times. This argument, 
commonly made by commentators in the UK, should be treated 
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with some caution because during the same period, expenditure 
on a beneﬁt speciﬁcally earmarked for housing support for low- 
income families – Housing Beneﬁt – expended rapidly. Tenants 
with low incomes and limited assets could receive Housing Beneﬁt 
as a contribution towards private or indeed social housing rents. 
The difficulty for would-be tenants therefore arises primarily from 
the shrinking of the rental sector as a whole in this period. Only 
insofar as council houses had different characteristics (for exam- 
ple, in terms of quality) and therefore involved lower outlays on 
housing net of subsidy, would the shortage of council houses per 
se affect welfare. Differences in average quality between publicly 
and privately constructed housing are an important component of 
the model that we develop in subsequent sections. 
There are two other groups to consider. First, there were resid- 
ual council tenants who chose not to (or were not in a ﬁnancial 
position to) exercise RTB. Inevitably ‘cherry-picking’ of better prop- 
erties by better-off tenants increased the likelihood of the public 
housing stock becoming over time a residual of the lowest qual- 
ity housing inhabited by the lowest income group – a process of 
‘ghettoization’ at odds with the ideals of some founders of ‘gar- 
den city’ public housing constructed for the working poor in the 
1930s. The second group were would-be homeowners. Although 
each RTB purchase transferred a property from the rented to the 
owned housing sector, initially a RTB property came with an owner 
who was restricted in his or her capacity to resell the property by 
the statutory limitations on resale. Over time, however, such prop- 
erties would come on the resale market due to moves into private 
rental, upscaling to better quality houses, foreclosure, deaths, or 
changes in family composition. If council properties were signiﬁ- 
cantly different from privately-constructed properties (for example, 
of lower quality and therefore cheaper), this would change the dis- 
tribution of available types of properties in the private market, for 
example providing access to cheaper properties for private tenants 
aspiring to be ﬁrst-time buyers. Hence the RTB policy had implica- 
tions for equilibrium in the market for home-ownership as well as 
the rental market. 
Finally, some developments of the RTB policy in later years 
should be mentioned. On the one hand, the Labour government 
that came to power in 1997 decided to tighten up the rules for 
selling council houses. A series of measures between 1998 and 
2004 tightened eligibility conditions, limited access to publicly- 
provided mortgages, extended and restricted conditions on resale 
and capped discounts in areas of greatest council housing short- 
ages such as London (for details, see Jones and Murie, 2006; House 
of Commons, 2012 ). For example, in 2003, the maximum abso- 
lute discount on a council property for RTB in all but two Lon- 
don boroughs was reduced to £16,0 0 0. Since London is the area 
of the highest house prices and rents, this reduced the RTB incen- 
tive to a fraction of that available during the 1980s. Subsequently, 
for similar reasons, the national government in Scotland ceased 
council-house sales altogether. On the other hand, as we have al- 
ready mentioned, the Labour government allowed a relaxation of 
the restrictions on the purchase of properties held by social hous- 
ing associations under the provisions of ‘Right to Acquire’. 
This is not quite the end of the story of the UK RTB policy. In 
2012 the new Coalition government between the Conservatives and 
the Liberal Democrats announced that they wished to ‘reinvigorate’ 
the RTB policy. The central policy proposal, subsequently imple- 
mented, was to raise the maximum discount to £75,0 0 0 across all 
local authorities irrespective of local housing prices outside Lon- 
don, and indeed to £10 0,0 0 0 within London. The government also 
proposed that local authorities might be able to retain a greater 
fraction of the proceeds from council-house sales as long as the 
proceeds were used to construct replacement affordable (i.e. rela- 
tively low quality) housing units. As Charts 2 and 3 suggest, there 
is some evidence that the latest policy has increased the rate of 
council-house sales but as yet little evidence of an upturn in con- 
struction of council housing. 
2. A model of housing tenure 
In this section, we consider a model of housing tenure in the 
absence of Right to Buy but with the presence of a public hous- 
ing sector. We ﬁrst describe the setting, as one of heterogeneous 
households facing different income processes. This heterogeneity 
of income proﬁles plays a key role in the allocation of households 
across tenure types. We follow this with a simple model of equi- 
librium in the private housing market, in terms of the choice be- 
tween owning and renting properties, and the implications thereof 
for housing prices and rents. We then extend the model to include 
a public housing sector. 
To examine this choice of housing tenure, we consider a 
discrete-time economy with two goods: a nondurable good (for ex- 
ample, food) and a durable good – housing. We suppose that the 
nondurable good is non-storable, hence it is produced and con- 
sumed within each period. In contrast, the durable good, housing, 
is storable but requires maintenance costs after usage. These costs 
equal a fraction of the end-of-period housing value and are borne 
by the owner – whether the private homeowner or the private or 
public landlord. We abstract from capital gains on privately-owned 
housing. 
There are different types of houses – for example by size, qual- 
ity of construction, amenity value, etc., in both the public and pri- 
vate sectors. Given this menu of choices, houses in the private sec- 
tor are broadly allocated by factors such as household composition 
and household income. Public housing is also heterogeneous and 
will typically be matched to eligible households of given composi- 
tion by an administrative formula (e.g. relating number of rooms 
to size of family). 
It has been well-documented in the United States that public 
production of public housing is cost-inefficient relative to private 
construction (see, for example, Schill, 1993 and Olsen, 2003 ). We 
have found no evidence that UK public housing on average has 
been more costly to construct or maintain than private housing, 
although the lack of a cost differential may arise from the scarcity 
of land for private development and planning restrictions in the 
United Kingdom which have forced up the price of land and hence 
the cost of new private housing. On the other hand, it has been 
documented that UK public housing is on average of lower quality 
than equivalent private houses by type (e.g. number of bedrooms) 
in the sense of ﬂoor space per person, amenities, etc. ( Forrest and 
Murie, 1990 ). This is also reﬂected in the price of council housing 
sold under the RTB policy where a discount of 20% on resold RTB 
dwellings relative to similar privately-constructed housing types is 
typical ( Jones and Murie, 1999; 2006 ). 4 Hence, we assume that the 
possible range of public housing quality is between zero and one, 
with the quality of any type of public housing at best equal to the 
equivalent privately-owned house which is normalized to one and 
at worse of some positive quality close to zero. We also assume 
that the demand for housing ‘quality’ is increasing in household 
income and wealth, which will be incorporated into the general 
form of household utility that is increasing in consumption and 
housing. However, we do not assume that the costs of public and 
private construction, quality-adjusted, differ across sectors. 5 
4 As mentioned in the previous section, dwellings under RTB are not a random 
sample of local authority dwellings. The RTB policy allows ‘cherry-picking’ of the 
more attractive local authority-owned properties. 
5 The assumption is not needed for the subsequent argument, so long as the pub- 
lic sector is not signiﬁcantly less efficient than the private sector in terms of cost of 
construction. 
R. Disney, G. Luo / Journal of Housing Economics 35 (2017) 51–68 55 
We now brieﬂy sketch out the basic model of households’ 
choice of tenure and pricing of owned and rented houses in the 
private sector. We need to do this because, as we shall consider in 
due course, council tenants who exercise RTB may then have the 
option to resell their purchased council houses and rent in the pri- 
vate sector. 
2.1. Households’ choice of private-housing tenure 
Consider a simple economy where households are heteroge- 
neous in their current income and expected future incomes. In any 
period, there are two possible outcomes of household income: a 
‘Low’ income Y L and a ‘High’ income Y H . The income process is 
risky. Households also differ in their lifetime wealth arising from 
their cumulated incomes, which is characterized by their ability to 
obtain the high income in any period, deﬁned as λi , where λi ∈ 
(0, 1) for any household i . For expositional purposes we discretize 
the distribution of households into three wealth categories: ‘high’ 
wealth households who almost always receive ‘high’ income draws, 
‘middle’ wealth households who have a relatively high probability 
of receiving the high income but whose income process is more 
volatile (such as self-employed or skilled manual workers), and 
‘low’ wealth households who almost always receive ‘low’ income 
draws. Denote these three types of households as, respectively, λh 
(where λh is close to one), λm (where λm is within a region of 
0.5), and λl (where λl is close to zero) households. Assume that 
the measure of each type of households, N i , i ∈ { h, m, l }, remains 
ﬁxed over time. Since the primary focus of this paper is on the de- 
cision to exercise the RTB option on public housing, we will mostly 
abstract from high-wealth households with consistent draws of Y H 
for two reasons: ﬁrst, they tend to own rather than rent (see be- 
low), and second, they are ineligible to apply for council housing. 
Our model proceeds as follows. Households generate utility 
from non-durable consumption and from durable housing. For sim- 
plicity, we assume no borrowing other than mortgages and no sav- 
ing other than the repayment of mortgages. In general form, the 
utility of a household is a strictly increasing and concave func- 
tion of consumption, housing and of whether the household is an 
owner-occupier or tenant: 
u (C jt , H jt , ψ jt ) , (1) 
where C jt is household j ’s consumption, H jt is its consumption 
of housing ‘units’, and ψ jt is the indicator function of whether 
household j is a homeowner ( ψ t = 1 ) or a tenant ( ψ t = 0 ). Hous- 
ing ‘units’ can be thought of as having both a quantity dimen- 
sion (e.g. number of rooms) and a quality dimension (e.g. size of 
rooms, quality of ﬁttings). Both consumption and housing are nor- 
mal goods hence demand for either increases with income and 
wealth. Our assumption that households like quality implies that 
the cross derivative of utility is positive: u CH > 0. We also as- 
sume, as in other models such as Kiyotaki et al. (2011) that house- 
holds, other things being equal, obtain greater utility from owning 
than renting, since home ownership allows the household greater 
freedom in terms of home improvement, interior decoration, etc. 
Higher levels of housing consumption increase the utility of home- 
owners more than tenants. This also implies that the utility incre- 
ment, in terms of housing quality, associated with shifting from 
renting to home ownership exceeds the increment in the utility of 
consumption: u H (C, H, 1) − u H (C, H, 0) > u C (C, H, 1) − u C (C, H, 0) . 
Costs of housing are determined as follows. Let P be the price of 
a quality-adjusted housing unit. We assume that there is a main- 
tenance cost per unit of housing, δ, which is borne by the home- 
owner whether he or she lives in or rents out the property. House- 
holds who choose to purchase houses ﬁnance their home owner- 
ship through mortgages provided by a private ﬁnancial institution. 
Mortgages are paid at the end of each period, amortized to inﬁn- 
ity and incur an interest charge r . We assume that there is a ﬁxed 
adjustment cost or utility decrement FC of purchasing a housing 
unit. This ﬁxed cost is proportional to the quality of the unit of 
housing and includes agency fees, house insurance, taxes on house 
purchase, and the opportunity cost of any down payment on the 
mortgage. Having paid the ﬁxed cost to purchase a house, a home- 
owner pays the mortgage plus the maintenance cost of the house 
in each period i.e. (r + δ) P . 
We now make a key assumption. We assume that high-wealth 
households receive enough high income ‘draws’ to overcome the 
ﬁxed cost component of purchase (and given that the demand 
for housing quality is increasing in income and wealth). How- 
ever, middle- and low-wealth households do not receive enough 
high income ‘draws’ for the ﬁxed cost hurdle to be overcome. 6 
Middle-wealth households, who prefer higher quality than low- 
wealth households, can rent privately but cannot buy homes. Given 
this sorting among households, private housebuilders only con- 
struct high-quality homes to satisfy the housing need of high- 
wealth households and middle-wealth households (as renters). 
The private rental market functions such that the average rent 
equals the amortized value of a house. Then the per unit hous- 
ing rent is R = (r + δ) P, and the equilibrium rent of a house con- 
structed by private housebuilders maximizes the utility of a high- 
income tenant. Hence the private housing rent equals a high- 
income tenant’s marginal rate of substitution of housing for con- 
sumption, which measures how many units of consumption goods 
that the tenant would like to give up for one additional unit of 
housing. Normalizing the quality of the house that a high-income 
tenant decides to rent to one, the equilibrium private housing rent 
is determined in Eq. (2) as follows. 
R = 
u H (Y 
H − R, 1 , 0) 
u C (Y H − R, 1 , 0) 
, (2) 
where rents are hedonically related to housing characteristics. 
At equilibrium, the value function, V i ( Y jt , H jt , ψ jt ), of a 
high-, middle-, or low-wealth ( i ∈ { h, m, l }) household who receives 
the high or low income ( Y jt = { Y 
H , Y L } ) and lives in an owned or 
rented house ( ψ jt = { 1 , 0 } ) of quality H jt satisﬁes: 
rV i (Y jt , H jt , ψ jt ) = −rF C · H jt ψ jt + 
r 
1 + r 
u (Y jt − RH jt , H jt , ψ jt ) 
+ 
λi 
1 + r 
u (Y H − RH jt , H jt , ψ jt ) 
+ 
1 − λi 
1 + r 
u (Y L − RH jt , H jt , ψ jt ) . (3) 
The value of owning a private house, V i ( Y jt , H jt , 1), equals the cur- 
rent utility of living in one’s own house plus the future value of 
owner-occupation whether receiving the high or low income, mi- 
nus the ﬁxed cost of purchasing the house. In contrast, the value 
of renting a private house, V i ( Y jt , H jt , 0), equals the lifetime value 
of renting a private housing whether receiving the high or low in- 
come. 
Tenure choice between owning and renting depends on two 
factors: the probability that a household has a high income ‘draw’ 
i.e. λi ( i ∈ { h, m, l }) and the ﬁxed adjustment cost (decrement of 
utility) associated with purchasing a house. We can formulate our 
assumptions as follows. 
Assumption 1. Assume that the ﬁxed cost of owning a house is large 
such that after paying the amortized ﬁxed cost, only high-income 
but not low-income homeowners generate higher utility living in 
6 We could also realistically assume that low income households facing a bor- 
rowing constraint but a ﬁxed cost component to house purchase is sufficient for 
our model. 
56 R. Disney, G. Luo / Journal of Housing Economics 35 (2017) 51–68 
owned relative to rented private housing, that is: 
u (Y L − R, 1 , 1) − u (Y L − R, 1 , 0) < rF C < u (Y H − R, 1 , 1) 
−u (Y H − R, 1 , 0) , (4) 
even though owning a high quality private house increases low- 
income households’ utility by a larger amount than the ﬁxed ad- 
justment cost of owning the house, that is: 
−Ru C (Y 
L − R, 1 , 1) + u H (Y 
L − R, 1 , 1) > rF C. (5) 
Assume also that λh > λ¯ > λm (and hence λl < λ¯), where λ¯ is the 
‘break even’ probability of receiving the high income at which a 
household is just indifferent between owning and renting a private 
house: 
λ¯ = 
−( u (Y L −R, 1 , 1) −u (Y L −R, 1 , 0) −rF C ) −r ( u (Y H −R, 1 , 1) −u (Y H −R, 1 , 0) −rF C ) 
−( u (Y L −R, 1 , 1) −u (Y L −R, 1 , 0) ) + ( u (Y H −R, 1 , 1) −u (Y H −R, 1 , 0) ) 
. (6) 
This has two implications. First, the stock of private housing, 
whether owner-occupied, or rented out by landlords, reﬂects the 
quality choices of those with sufficient high income ‘draws’ (since 
landlords must also have purchased their properties). Second, high- 
wealth households can either rent or buy privately but middle- 
wealth households can only rent privately given the ﬁxed cost con- 
straint. Low-wealth households would prefer lower quality housing 
and, without government transfers, may be homeless. 
2.2. Council housing 
We now extend the model to an additional form of tenure: pub- 
lic (‘council’) housing. We make two reasonable assumptions. First, 
we assume that at the time that most of the council house stock 
was constructed, there was no expectation that a Right-to-Buy pol- 
icy would later be introduced. Second, we assume that the local 
authority wishes to maximize the utility of low-wealth tenants, al- 
though there will inevitably be some middle-wealth tenants with 
low income outcomes who apply for and obtain council houses. 
We therefore consider a ‘steady state’ in which the quality of newly 
constructed council houses remains the same as does the budget 
of local authorities. 7 We then consider the council house sector in 
three stages: ﬁrst, the budget constraint facing local authorities; 
second, the choice by local authorities as to what quality of coun- 
cil house to construct and how to allocate them among applicants 
and third, the ensuing choices facing households. 
To apply for public (council) housing, an applicant must have 
a current low income Y L . We assume that this income draw is 
observable to the local public authority; however the cumulated 
process of income draws (‘wealth’) is private information to the 
household. The overt criteria that local authorities use for allocat- 
ing public housing vary but are usually based on a set of criteria 
that proxy current low incomes (for example, family size relative to 
income, affordability of private accommodation etc.). There is gen- 
erally not an explicit wealth test applied to applicants for council 
housing. 
The supply of council houses is determined as follows: local au- 
thorities borrow money up to a given constraint from central gov- 
ernment in order to construct houses. Deﬁne the total budget con- 
straint of the local authority in any period as B , and the interest 
rate as r – we abstract for simplicity from any difference in mort- 
gage rates faced by households and the borrowing costs of local 
authorities. In cash ﬂow terms, local authorities receive rents from 
7 In reality, evidence suggests that the quality of new builds declined over time, 
as we shall demonstrate empirically later in the paper. This may reﬂect both tight- 
ened ﬁnancial constraints of local authorities by central government, but also the 
changing nature of council house applicants themselves as real incomes rose over 
time, given the relationship between income level and the demand for quality in 
housing. 
council tenants, possibly supplemented by other central govern- 
ment transfers, pay interest on loans borrowed to construct hous- 
ing and pay for maintenance of their existing public housing stock. 
The amortized cost of constructing and maintaining a new council 
house of given quality η is R η, where η ≤ 1 and the average qual- 
ity of a privately owned house is normalized to one. Deﬁne T as 
the rent subsidy per period to a council tenant, where T ≥ 0 and 
the rent subsidy is deﬁned as the reduction in rent below the pri- 
vate sector rental on a house of equivalent quality; hence council 
tenants pay rent of Rη − T to the local authority in each period. 8 
Since the cost of constructing houses and the budget constraint 
are exogenous, the only variables available to local authorities are 
the average rent subsidy, T , and the average quality of council 
houses, η – that is, the local authority can spread its budget more 
thinly by constructing lower quality housing – in the form of, for 
example, apartments rather than houses, lower ﬂoor space per 
room, lower quality decoration, conﬁned size of gardens or yards 
etc. The demand for council houses will depend positively on the 
average quality of the stock of houses. Of course, this average qual- 
ity of council housing is constrained insofar as it cannot be so low 
that no one wishes to rent a council house or, on the other hand, 
so high that it exceeds the effective budget constraint. 
In this setting, the local authority solves a problem that deter- 
mines the average quality of council houses, the stock of applicants 
for council houses and (in due course) the likelihood that existing 
tenants will wish to exercise RTB. Assume that the local author- 
ity has a priority ordering among would be council-house appli- 
cants, and that the local authority’s key observable of ‘need’ is cur- 
rent income. The council house rental system comprises two com- 
ponents: existing tenancies and a waiting list. The local authority 
can verify that an applicant joining the waiting list for a council 
house has a low income. We have already assumed that a house- 
hold with a high income is not eligible for a council house, that 
lifetime permanent income or wealth is private information to the 
household (and that there is no wealth test for council house eligi- 
bility 9 ), and that existing council tenants are not regularly income- 
tested. Therefore, from our assumptions in Section 2.1 , applicants 
for council houses will be comprised of those with persistent low 
incomes (who we deﬁned as ‘low wealth’) and a fraction of those 
with volatile incomes (who we deﬁned as ‘middle wealth’). The 
lower the quality of houses that the local authority chooses to con- 
struct, the shorter the waiting list for two reasons: ﬁrst, there are 
more council houses, and second, given that the demand for qual- 
ity is increasing in income, lower quality will deter some middle- 
wealth applicants. 
The local authority has a choice over two variables: T and η. 
The subsidy on rents, T , is effectively constrained by the cash 
ﬂow of the local authority since the rent collected must be suf- 
ﬁcient to cover maintenance plus interest payments on previously- 
constructed council houses less any additional grants from the cen- 
tral government. Hence, the average rent subsidy per council house 
equals the per household central government grants or subsidies to 
local authority current housing budgets. 
8 The effective discount below market rents payable by council tenants has var- 
ied over time. Generally, attempts to raise council rents towards market levels 
have shifted the burden of the subsidy away from local authorities towards cen- 
tral government, since higher council rents generally increase eligibility by tenants 
for Housing Beneﬁt – the means-tested support for housing costs provided by cen- 
tral government. We do not consider this interesting question of incidence further 
in this paper. 
9 Applicants for council housing cannot already own a property. Other asset tests 
are not generally mentioned in local authority published criteria for eligibility for 
council housing. As mentioned, asset tests are applied to applications for Housing 
Beneﬁt, administered by local government on behalf of central government, but this 
is a separate issue. 
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The choice in quality dimension is more interesting, insofar as 
there is a trade-off for local authorities. If the budget is sufficiently 
large, the local authority can construct enough low quality hous- 
ing units to satisfy current demand with the intention of elimi- 
nating the waiting list (partly by deterring some applicants). Then 
the optimal quality of council housing, η⋆ , maximizes the low- 
income households’ utility of renting council houses, which in turn 
solves: 
R = 
u H (Y 
L − Rη⋆ + T , η⋆ , 0) 
u C (Y L − Rη⋆ + T , η⋆ , 0) 
. (7) 
Thus, at equilibrium, it is optimal for the local authorities to pro- 
vide rented council housing of this quality, η⋆ , which is lower than 
private-housing quality, to all low-income households and increase 
their aggregate utility by X W , where X is the total measure of 
low-income households in each period either of low wealth or 
middle wealth and W is the increment of any low-income ten- 
ant’s value from renting a council house relative to a private house. 
Thus, X = 
(
1 − λl 
)
N l + ( 1 − λm ) N m , where N l ( N m ) is deﬁned as 
the measure of low-wealth (middle-wealth) households assumed 
ﬁxed over time. Further, renting a council house relative to a pri- 
vate one increases the utility of a low-income tenant by r W , 
where: 
rW = u (Y L − Rη⋆ + T , η⋆ , 0) − u (Y L − R, 1 , 0) . (8) 
Alternatively, the local authority can construct fewer units of 
higher quality within its budget constraint. This will increase the 
waiting list but, because the income can be validated during the 
application process, it can use a queueing system to eliminate 
some applicants. Households may have several income realizations 
before they reach the top of the waiting list and some of those 
with volatile incomes may be sifted out by requiring high-income 
households to leave the queue. However, a certain fraction of those 
with volatile incomes may wish subsequently to reapply to the 
waiting list in order to obtain council housing, insofar as risk aver- 
sion and subsidized rentals lead them to prefer council house ten- 
ancy to either private ownership or private renting. 
3. A model of Right to Buy with no resale 
In this section we examine the impact on the welfare of low 
income households of introducing the Right to Buy council houses 
at a value that is discounted relative to the market price. Once a 
household has purchased a council house through the RTB scheme, 
it is not subject to any income test, but referring back to the dis- 
cussion in Section 1.1 , the current UK policy allows unrestricted 
sale of a RTB house in the open market only after a certain pe- 
riod, otherwise any monetary discount on the RTB sale must be 
returned to the local authority. At this point we consider a ‘re- 
stricted’ RTB policy in which the purchaser has to return any mon- 
etary discount on the RTB sale to the local authority when reselling 
the property in the open market at any time. Among the RTB re- 
forms investigated in the next section, a ‘less restrictive’ policy 
takes the form of either imposing a duration of ownership after 
which an open market sale could take place, or varying the dis- 
count formula such that a fraction instead of all of the discount is 
returned irrespective on when the open market resale takes place. 
As we shall demonstrate in due course, the impact of such restric- 
tions depends crucially on the quality of council houses that are 
sold relative to the existing private stock. 
Following the discussion in the previous section, a local author- 
ity provides council housing of quality η⋆ , which solves the equi- 
librium condition stated in (7) , to all low-income households of 
measure X and equally distributes the grant on the housing bud- 
get from the central government among council tenants as a rent 
subsidy, T . We wish to investigate the welfare gains to council ten- 
ants from exercising RTB, if eligible. Clearly the potential gains to 
exercising RTB will vary across such households according to their 
preferences, income and wealth, quality of their council properties 
and so on. 
Low-wealth council tenants have a higher probability of re- 
maining in poverty than middle-wealth tenants. But low-wealth 
tenants have a higher value of exercising RTB than middle-wealth 
tenants, as we shall explain shortly. The local authority’s stock 
of council houses decreases more rapidly when both low- and 
middle-wealth tenants are interested in exercising RTB. At equilib- 
rium, for a middle-wealth ( i = m ) or low-wealth ( i = l) low-income 
council tenant, his or her value of exercising RTB, V i 
RT B , equals the 
lifetime utility of living in the RTB house when receiving the low 
income and the maximum of either living in the house or rent- 
ing a private house but enjoying the beneﬁt from renting out the 
RTB house when receiving the high income, less the ﬁxed cost of 
purchasing a house. The value function of not exercising RTB and 
hence staying as a tenant, V i 
T , equals the lifetime value of renting 
a council house if the household is allocated one otherwise rent- 
ing a private house when receiving the low income plus the value 
of renting a private house when receiving the high income. That 
is: 
rV i RT B = − rF Cη + 
(
1 −
λi 
1 + r 
)
u (Y L − Rη⋆ + T , η⋆ , 1) 
+ 
λi 
1 + r 
max 
{
u (Y H − Rη⋆ + T , η⋆ , 1) , u (Y H − R + T , 1 , 0) 
}
;
rV i T = 
(
1 −
λi 
1 + r 
)(
γ u (Y L − Rη⋆ + T , η⋆ , 0) + (1 − γ ) u (Y L − R, 1 , 0) 
)
+ 
λi 
1 + r 
u (Y H − R, 1 , 0) , 
(9) 
where γ is the equilibrium probability of obtaining a council house 
when receiving the low income, hence 1 − γ is the probability of 
not receiving a council house to rent when receiving a low income 
among both middle- and low-wealth households. 
Whether council tenants are interested in exercising RTB de- 
pends on both the quality of their council houses and their wealth 
status – low- or middle-wealth. When the quality of a council 
house is high (i.e. close to that in the private sector), a RTB pur- 
chase is attractive because the beneﬁt of owning a RTB house in 
low income periods outweighs the foregone opportunity of renting 
a private house in high-income periods. Then both middle- and 
low-wealth council tenants are interested in purchasing council 
houses through the RTB policy. However, when the average quality 
of council housing is signiﬁcantly below that of the private sec- 
tor, only low-wealth council tenants are interested in purchasing 
their rented council houses by exercising RTB in order to live in 
them thereafter. Of course, if the quality of council houses is ex- 
tremely low, no council tenant will wish to purchase their prop- 
erty through RTB. Also, as we shall show in a subsequent section, 
the ‘no resale’ constraint is only binding when the quality of the 
council house is sufficiently low that the tenant does not wish to 
live in it after purchase. 
The intuition of (9) is as follows. When exercising RTB, a coun- 
cil tenant pays the ﬁxed cost of home ownership in utility propor- 
tional to the quality of the RTB house. The RTB purchaser can live 
in or rent out the house but is excluded from future council hous- 
ing provided by the local authorities. Any monetary discount on a 
RTB sale has to be returned to the local authority in a resale; and 
since the ﬁxed cost of home ownership is large, as deﬁned in As- 
sumption 1, exercising RTB in order to resell the RTB house is sub- 
optimal. Therefore, middle-wealth RTB purchasers prefer living in 
rented high-quality private houses to living in low-quality houses 
hence rent out their RTB properties to low-income tenants. When 
not exercising RTB, either middle- or low-wealth tenants receive 
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council housing with probability γ in low-income periods. They 
have to rent private houses when they are unable to obtain coun- 
cil housing, which happens in any high-income period and with 
probability 1 − γ in a low-income period. 
At equilibrium, the residual council house stock as the RTB pol- 
icy evolves is composed of low quality housing that council tenants 
do not wish to buy. Hence the policy has a natural life span as the 
average quality decreases. This depletion of the stock increases the 
waiting time for future generations of would-be council tenants. 
However, the decision to exercise RTB by an existing tenant should 
also be based on an expectation of the probability of obtaining a 
council house in the future. If the proceeds from RTB sales are not 
available to local councils to construct replacement homes, a para- 
dox of the RTB policy is that it may increase the incentive of an eli- 
gible council tenant on the margin to purchase the property, hence 
reducing the stock still further. RTB purchase acts as a form of in- 
surance by guaranteeing that the purchaser has a property to live 
in future periods of low income (in periods of high income, he or 
she can rent out the property and rent a private house of higher 
quality). In contrast, if the council tenant in periods of high in- 
come had simply exited the council house sector and attempted to 
re-enter during low income periods, he or she would be thwarted 
by the lengthening queue as the stock was sold off. Hence the ex- 
pectation of low quantity of council housing in the future drives 
down the quality threshold at which no council tenant wishes to 
buy their property through RTB. 
Whether RTB increases the aggregate welfare of low-wealth 
households also depends on the quality of council housing. On 
one hand, an increase in the average quality of council houses in 
any particular local authority increases the attractiveness of exer- 
cising RTB and hence diminishes the quantity of council housing, 
both presently (because of the budget constraint issue discussed 
in the previous section) and in the future (because of the acceler- 
ated rate of RTB sales). From a social welfare viewpoint, the util- 
ity obtained by council tenants from exercising RTB and owning 
relatively higher-quality ex-council houses has to be traded-off in 
welfare terms against the loss of utility to would-be future council 
tenants for whom public housing is no longer available. In general, 
any low-income household gains utility from RTB – whether low- 
or middle-wealth – when the average quality of council housing 
is higher. On the other hand, the RTB policy is better-targeted on 
low-wealth households when housing quality is lower for two rea- 
sons: ﬁrst, low-wealth rather than middle-wealth households who 
exercise RTB disproportionately gain from the policy; secondly, the 
stock of council housing, other things being equal, is larger and 
hence the availability of council housing for would-be council ten- 
ants in the future is larger. 
We wish to analyze the overall implication of the RTB policy 
on the assumption that the social planner wishes to maximize the 
welfare of low-wealth households, previously excluded from the 
private housing market. As we have shown, in practice housing 
policy towards low-wealth households in the UK is partly deter- 
mined by the central government (through setting the discount on 
RTB sales and by allocating housing budgets to local authorities) 
and partly by local authorities (by their council-house-allocation 
policies and by the level of rent subsidies to council tenants). 
From the viewpoint of the social planner, local and central poli- 
cies should be consistent in the sense that the ‘service’ provided 
(in this context, effective housing subsidies to low-wealth house- 
holds) should be of equal cost. This then allows us to investigate 
the speciﬁc behavioral impact on council tenants of the RTB policy. 
Accordingly, we assume initially that the average discount on a 
RTB sale set by the central authority is equal to the average rent 
subsidy that a local authority can provide to its remaining tenants 
through some adjustment of local-authority budgets by the cen- 
tral government. In such circumstances, the equilibrium of the RTB 
policy and its welfare implications can be summarized in the fol- 
lowing proposition (detailed proofs are provided in Appendix 1 ). 
Proposition 1. RTB houses of quality above ηl attract low-wealth 
purchasers, of which the diminishing stock is foreseen by middle- 
wealth council tenants who exercise RTB on houses of quality higher 
than max { ηl , ηm }, where ηl and ηm solve: 
u (Y H − Rηl + T , ηl , 1) − u (Y H − R, 1 , 0) − rF Cηl 
u (Y L − Rηl + T , ηl , 1) − u (Y L − Rηl + T , ηl , 0) − rF Cηl 
= 1 −
1 + r 
λl 
;
u (Y H − Rηm + T , ηm , 1) − u (Y H − R, 1 , 0) − rF Cηm 
u (Y L − Rηm + T , ηm , 1) − u (Y L − R, 1 , 0) − rF Cηm 
= 1 −
1 + r 
λm 
. (10) 
If council houses are of quality above ηl and below ηm , then 
exercising RTB can improve the aggregate welfare of low-wealth 
households – the gains to (largely low-wealth) RTB purchasers 
outweigh the losses to would-be future council tenants. If coun- 
cil houses are of higher quality than ηm , both middle- and low- 
wealth households exercise RTB, which lowers the residual sup- 
ply of council houses for future would-be council tenants. Then 
the aggregate welfare of low-wealth households decreases since 
the losses to those who cannot obtain council housing exceed the 
gains by RTB purchasers, given that many of these are middle- 
wealth households who are not the priority of the social planner. 
Conversely, if the average quality of council houses is below ηl , the 
RTB policy has no effect because no council tenant exercises RTB 
in such circumstances. 
3.1. Some empirical results 
In this section, we provide empirical support for some of the 
theoretical propositions advanced in previous sections. We ﬁrst ex- 
amine the characteristics of council house and how these have 
evolved over time for a representative set of local authorities dur- 
ing the Right-to-Buy period. We show that public (council) hous- 
ing stocks were highly heterogeneous across housing types among 
local authorities, reﬂecting the nature of successive waves of coun- 
cil house construction between the 1920s and the 1960s. Second, 
we illustrate the process by which RTB sales not only reduced the 
stock of council houses but also shifted the residual public housing 
stock towards lower quality housing. 
We then look at the characteristics of council tenants, and how 
these have evolved during the years of the RTB policy. We show 
that council tenants are poorer than households in the private sec- 
tor (whether renters or owners) with both a higher unemploy- 
ment rate and a lower employment rate. They are also more likely 
to be single, divorced and have more volatile incomes than indi- 
viduals in private sector tenures. We also show that those who 
have opted to exercise their RTB typically have higher employ- 
ment rate and incomes than other council tenants (but lower than 
those households already in the private sector). Their risk of unem- 
ployment is on a par with other private sector tenants and own- 
ers rather than residual council tenants by the end of the RTB 
period. 
In relation to housing stocks: by way of background, there are 
roughly 400 local authorities in England and Wales with average 
population size of around 120,0 0 0 individuals (std dev 10 0,0 0 0). 
Each local authority has had a degree of autonomy in the coun- 
cil house building polices subject to the central government con- 
straints outlined in Section 1 . However, dwellings constructed in 
the interwar period (1939-45) were predominantly houses, often 
with several bedrooms, in suburban estates. Later, given the need 
for rapid post-1945 reconstruction of housing in city centers due 
to bomb damage, and the changing needs of tenants (as working 
families were predominantly replaced by the homeless, single par- 
ents etc. in the queues for public housing), the focus was on build- 
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Table 1 
Evolution of characteristics of local authority housing: selected authorities. 
% of total stock 1 bedroom 
apartments 
2 bedroom 
apartments 
3 bedroom 
apartments 
1 and 2 
bedroom 
houses 
3 bedroom 
houses 
Bungalows 4 bedroom 
dwellings and 
others 
% change in total 
stock relative to 
1980 
Name of Local authority 
Hackney (Inner London) 
1980 0 .259 0 .324 0 .216 0 .002 0 .063 0 .0 0 0 0 .137 
1986 0 .342 0 .300 0 .203 0 .007 0 .048 0 .0 0 0 0 .100 0 .694 
1991 0 .293 0 .380 0 .216 0 .006 0 .046 0 .004 0 .054 0 .603 
Barnet (Outer London) 
1980 0 .185 0 .279 0 .086 0 .111 0 .265 0 .008 0 .067 
1986 0 .200 0 .293 0 .080 0 .123 0 .240 0 .008 0 .056 −0 .034 
1991 0 .263 0 .296 0 .065 0 .119 0 .224 0 .013 0 .019 −0 .194 
Derby (mid-England) 
1980 0 .111 0 .066 0 .015 0 .140 0 .580 0 .059 0 .028 
1986 0 .152 0 .084 0 .017 0 .141 0 .506 0 .066 0 .034 −0 .144 
1991 0 .176 0 .094 0 .007 0 .141 0 .475 0 .077 0 .030 −0 .269 
Wigan (NW England) 
1980 0 .122 0 .080 0 .029 0 .146 0 .522 0 .068 0 .032 
1986 0 .137 0 .087 0 .026 0 .155 0 .491 0 .085 0 .019 −0 .088 
1991 0 .139 0 .085 0 .005 0 .161 0 .495 0 .095 0 .019 −0 .187 
Gloucester (SW England) 
1980 0 .190 0 .133 0 .024 0 .047 0 .445 0 .083 0 .080 
1986 0 .211 0 .137 0 .024 0 .113 0 .365 0 .077 0 .073 −0 .034 
1991 0 .228 0 .149 0 .023 0 .112 0 .349 0 .097 0 .043 −0 .093 
Newcastle (NE England) 
1980 0 .118 0 .188 0 .041 0 .125 0 .409 0 .045 0 .074 
1986 0 .129 0 .202 0 .035 0 .134 0 .373 0 .059 0 .069 −0 .078 
1991 0 .122 0 .210 0 .032 0 .141 0 .362 0 .065 0 .069 −0 .165 
Swansea (W Wales) 
1980 0 .110 0 .116 0 .022 0 .278 0 .434 0 .019 0 .021 
1986 0 .122 0 .126 0 .026 0 .290 0 .394 0 .022 0 .020 −0 .055 
1991 0 .144 0 .136 0 .026 0 .291 0 .355 0 .027 0 .020 −0 .184 
Average 
1980 0 .147 0 .169 0 .062 0 .126 0 .394 0 .040 0 .062 
1986 0 .192 0 .190 0 .074 0 .122 0 .321 0 .043 0 .058 
1991 0 .192 0 .217 0 .073 0 .122 0 .305 0 .049 0 .042 
Source : Chartered Institute for Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) Housing Accounts , London. 
ing low-cost apartment blocks using cheap building materials and 
low-cost construction methods. 
Table 1 shows how, at the commencement of the RTB policy 
in 1980, council house stocks varied across local authorities. In 
Derby, for example, which is a relatively prosperous city specializ- 
ing in skilled manufacturing occupations (such as aeronautics, rail- 
way equipment, etc.), the largest component of the council housing 
stock was 3 bedroom houses, mostly constructed in the pre-1939 
period. This pattern is broadly replicated in the other local author- 
ities illustrated in the table other than Hackney (Inner London) 
where the emphasis was on building apartments. The table also 
illustrates that, as the RTB policy evolved, it was the share of these 
larger and more desirable properties that declined as a share of 
total council properties. This reﬂects the composition of RTB sales 
over time, whereby “cherry-picking” at an early stage meant that 
more desirable houses were sold early in the process whereas less 
desirable properties came onto the market later in the process. Il- 
lustrating the latter point: data from the Department of Communi- 
ties and Local Government (DCLG) shows that sales of apartments 
accounted for 7% of sales in 1986–87 but had risen to 37% of the 
total in 2014–15. 10 Finally, it should be noted from Table 1 that the 
reduction in the council house stock was fastest in areas with the 
most desirable properties, although some caution should be exer- 
cised on this ﬁnding given the association of housing stock type 
with political affiliation of local authorities. It is also interesting to 
note that Hackney (in common with other Inner London boroughs) 
continued to construct or acquire council housing during the post- 
1980 period, reﬂecting the pressures on social housing in London 
through most of the post-war period. 
Although council housing is heterogeneous, we have less evi- 
dence on quality within housing types. Nevertheless most of the 
10 DCLG (2016) Social Housing Sales, Table 681, London. 
evidence from specialists in this area suggests that council houses 
were of lower quality than equivalent-sized private properties in 
terms of size of room, quality of build, size of backyards or gar- 
dens (if any) etc. Research on resale values of properties bought 
under RTB using data from estate agents (realtors) conﬁrm this 
ﬁnding insofar as such properties resold at signiﬁcant discounts 
in Birmingham, Glasgow, Leeds, and London relative to privately- 
constructed similar properties ( Jones and Murie, 2006 , pp.103–
109). The same study illustrates that the acquisition and resale of 
RTB properties had signiﬁcant effects on the composition of local 
housing markets. There is also qualitative evidence that the qual- 
ity of builds declined over time, especially from the later 1950s 
when local authorities predominantly constructed low-cost apart- 
ment complexes. A careful search of the academic and professional 
literature for England and Wales has suggested that it is the reduc- 
tion in quality of build rather than the cost inefficiencies of local 
authorities that generated most controversy. Whereas the literature 
in the United State has focused on the cost overruns and inefficien- 
cies in the construction of public housing, it appears that in the 
United Kingdom, much tighter controls on costs led to a signiﬁcant 
deterioration of quality rather than inefficiency. This point should 
not be over-emphasized, given the lack of quantitative evidence 
(particularly for earlier periods), but may arise from the tight con- 
trol over ﬁnancial arrangements by central government described 
in Section 1 of the paper. 
We now turn to evidence on the character of council tenants 
and those who opted to exercise their Right to Buy their council 
property. The data are taken from 18 waves of the British House- 
hold Panel Survey (BHPS), a household survey very similar to the 
United States’ Panel Survey of Income Dynamics. The ﬁrst wave in 
the ﬁeld of the BHPS was conducted in 1991 and the last wave that 
we utilize is 2008. We do not capture the early years of the RTB 
but, not only would we expect these disparate characteristics of 
council tenants and private occupiers to be even more pronounced 
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in the pre-1991 period of council house sales but, even within the 
period 1991–2008 we see a signiﬁcant change in the fraction of 
council tenants in the sample. To include a measure of income 
volatility, we take all households that appear consecutively in at 
least 4 waves. This gives us a sample of more than 50,0 0 0 year-on- 
year responses. The survey asks a range of standard socioeconomic 
and demographic questions, as well as questions concerning hous- 
ing tenure. 
Of particular interest is that households are asked if they exer- 
cised their RTB option, and we use this information in the ensu- 
ing tables. Two points should be noted however: ﬁrst a signiﬁcant 
number appear to exit council house tenure without exercising 
RTB – this may be because of changing family and household cir- 
cumstances, but may also be because the council house transferred 
their property to a social or community (not-for-proﬁt) housing as- 
sociation to evade the initial RTB legislation (see the discussion in 
Section 1 ). To the extent that this last point is true, our differenti- 
ation of characteristics between council tenants and ‘other tenures’ 
will understate the differences in characteristics between those in 
private and social housing. Second, we do not know whether a 
council tenant was eligible for RTB if they did not buy (for rea- 
sons of eligibility - see Section 1 again). Hence we do know about 
potentially interesting households who may have been eligible to 
buy under the legislation but chose not to exercise that right. 
Table 2 gives some descriptive statistics that conﬁrm that there 
are differences both between council house tenants and other 
tenures, and also between residual council house tenants and those 
who chose in each period, or in past periods, to exercise their RTB 
option. It should also be noted that these are not only working 
age households; a signiﬁcant proportion of these households will 
have retired from the workforce (as indicated by the average ages 
of heads of households in the table) which explains why employ- 
ment rates are relatively low. The work status also refers to the 
head of household; other members of the household may have dif- 
ferent patterns of economic activity. 
Table 3 gives regression results concerning the correlates of be- 
ing in council house tenure (relative to other tenures), moving in to 
council house tenure from another tenure (within the period) and 
exercising RTB within the period. The ﬁrst column of results con- 
ﬁrms the descriptive statistics: council tenants tend to have lower 
and more variable incomes, be marginally younger, be less likely to 
be married, more likely to be divorced or a single parent and have 
a lower probability of being either employed or self-employed. The 
second column considers entrants to the council house sector. They 
are very unlikely to have come from owner occupation, and more 
likely to shift from social or private renting or living with rela- 
tives. Interestingly, in the light of the discussion of our theoretical 
model, income and income volatility do not appear to be the main 
screening devices governing entry to the council house sector, but 
rather personal status (such as being a single parent) and also lack 
of employment or self-employment (which, of course, are likely to 
correlate with income). This shows how the current council house 
waiting list system ‘tags’ individuals not by their income per se 
but by their family status and employment status. Finally the third 
column would be expected to be the mirror image of the second. 
Although the predictive power is low, we show that those who 
exercise their RTB option are likely to be younger and to be re- 
spectively, more likely to have become employed or self-employed 
since entering the sector, and less likely to be unemployed. 
4. Reforms to the RTB policy 
The previous section showed that the social welfare implica- 
tions of the RTB policy depend on the quality of the council hous- 
ing stock. With high quality council houses, too much beneﬁt is 
obtained by middle-wealth council tenants who are temporarily 
in poverty and exercise RTB at the expense of future low-wealth 
council housing applicants on the waiting list now and in the fu- 
ture. However, if the quality of council housing is lower, both cur- 
rent and future council tenants derive greater utility: in the former 
case by their higher gains in utility from exercising RTB, in the lat- 
ter case from the higher residual stock of council housing. In this 
section, we study four adjustments of the RTB policy which might 
better target the policy on low-wealth households rather than dis- 
proportionately beneﬁting middle-wealth households which hap- 
pened to be in possession of a council house by virtue of previous 
low income at the time the RTB policy was introduced. The re- 
forms to the RTB policies to be investigated are: (i) reducing the 
discounts on RTB sales; (ii) loosening resale restrictions; (iii) re- 
turning the proceeds from RTB sales to local authorities for new 
council housing construction; and (iv) replacing the RTB with rent 
subsidies in cash. 11 
4.1. RTB with reduced discount 
In the previous analysis, where we assumed that the average 
discounts on RTB sales equalled the rent subsidies given by local 
authorities to tenants, we showed that the aggregate welfare of 
low-wealth households would decrease were the RTB policy to in- 
duce a large number of middle-wealth households to take up the 
RTB option, leaving a reduced stock of council houses available for 
future generations of low-wealth householders. This would happen 
when the average quality of council houses was sufficiently high 
so as to attract middle-wealth households both to become council 
tenants in the past and then to exercise their right to purchase the 
house under the RTB policy. Hence the quality of council houses is 
a key variable when assessing reforms to the RTB policy. 
In this subsection, we examine whether the aggregate welfare 
of low-wealth households can be improved by reducing the aver- 
age discount rate that is applied to RTB sales. We model this as 
a reduction in the discount on the RTB house sale price relative 
to the rent subsidy received by existing tenants, i.e. by supposing 
that the discount on the sale price is only a fraction τ of the rent 
subsidy, where 0 ≤ τ < 1. Of course, the utility of owning a house 
through RTB is strictly increasing in τ so that such a policy will, on 
the margin, reduce the number of applicants for RTB. However the 
implication of such a policy in general on low-wealth households 
depends on the average quality of council houses. 
Reducing the discount on RTB houses when these are of low 
quality neither worsens nor improves the welfare of low-income 
households in general. From Proposition 1 in the previous sec- 
tion, when council houses are of quality below ηl , they attract no 
purchasers anyway. When houses are of quality above ηl but be- 
low ηm , only low-wealth purchasers are attracted to utilize the 
RTB policy to purchase their houses. A reduction in the discount 
11 An interesting possible reform that we do not consider in detail is that of 
targeting the subsidies for RTB purchase on low wealth tenants, not just because 
middle-wealth tenants already have strong incentives and resources with which 
to exercise RTB without a large subsidy, but also because the low wealth tenants 
are of primary concern in the planner’s objective function. However, such a strat- 
egy would involve the acquisition of costly information, given that local authorities 
generally use tagging by characteristics rather than direct information on income 
to assess the priority list of council tenants. Leaving aside incentives to conceal in- 
formation on incomes by existing council tenants, the signalling value of relatively 
short periods of income information is low, given that the stock of council tenants 
is composed of those with either persistent low incomes or highly volatile incomes. 
Hence council would have to acquire information on income dynamics over a rel- 
atively long period of time on all their tenants (including perhaps periods before 
they joined the queue for council housing) in order to sift out those who carry 
less weight in the planner’s objective function. In addition, the eligibility require- 
ments for RTB purchase require a minimum number of years’ tenure: those with 
serially-correlated positive income shocks over short periods would probably leave 
the council house sector anyway by trading up to higher quality private rentals or 
house purchases. 
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Table 2 
Characteristics of council house renters, RTB buyers and other households by period. 
Period 1991–96 1997–2002 2003–08 
% Council house tenants 16.5 14.8 11.7 
% RTB buyers among tenants 2.6 5.2 5.6 
Mean age of head of household 
Council house tenants 49.9 48.9 48.4 
Right-to-Buy 46.7 43.7 45.3 
Other tenures 45.7 46.5 47.7 
Mean monthly income (£) (std dev) 
Council house tenants 860 (650) 1010 (740) 1175 (770) 
Right-to-Buy 1385 (920) 1360 (940) 1420 (965) 
Other tenures 1875 (1330) 1920 (1385) 2170 (1430) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Council house tenants 10.9 7.9 8.2 
Right-to-Buy 1.2 5.6 2.0 
Other tenures 4.1 2.6 2.1 
Employment rate (%) 
Council house tenants 28.1 31.4 30.1 
Right-to-Buy 53.9 50.1 45.7 
Other tenures 56.3 57.9 58.5 
Source : own calculations: British Household Panel Survey 1991–2008. 
Table 3 
Probability of head of household renting a council house, moving to council house tenure or exercising Right-to Buy (all periods). 
Variable Renting a council house(Sample: all 
tenures) 
Moving to council house tenure(Sample: all 
tenures except council house) 
Exercising option of Right to Buy(Sample: council 
house tenure only) 
Coeff. (std error) Coeff. (std error) Coeff. (std error) 
Average income 0.048 ∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.003 (0.002) 0.025 (0.014) 
Std Dev income 0.026 ∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.001 (0.002) 0.011 (0.009) 
Age (years) 0.007 ∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.0 0 0) 0.006 ∗∗∗ (0.002) 
Married = 1 0.058 ∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.004 ∗ (0.002) 0.006 (0.009) 
Divorced = 1 0.015 ∗∗ (0.005) 0.002 (0.002) 0.008 (0.008) 
Single parent = 1 0.030 ∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.009 ∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.020 ∗ (0.009) 
Employed 0.148 ∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.013 ∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.016 ∗ (0.007) 
Self-employed 0.179 ∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.014 ∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.039 ∗ (0.016) 
Unemployed 0.005 (0.009) 0.008 ∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.021 ∗ (0.001) 
Time trend 0.001 ∗∗∗ (0.0 0 0) 0.0 0 02 ∗∗ (0.0 0 01) 0.003 ∗∗∗ (0.0 0 0) 
R 2 0.188 0.016 0.028 
Pr > 0.1282 0.0091 0.0843 
N 53438 46298 7140 
Notes : Sample: head of household only BHPS 1991–2008. Pooled cross-section estimates. Average and standard deviations of income over a minimum of 4 periods. Addi- 
tional controls: number of children in 5 age categories. Quadratic in age of head of household, education attainment of head of household (4 categories), ethnic identity. 
Self-reported health status (8 categories). Omitted categories: widowed, retired, not in labour force. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗ pr < 0.01, ∗∗∗pr < 0.005. 
on the price discourages some low-wealth households who would 
have gained utility by purchasing, but raises the welfare of future 
low-wealth households who will now be able to apply for coun- 
cil houses when current tenancies end. There may be intergenera- 
tional welfare changes among low-wealth households but there is 
no overall effect. 
Reducing the discount on RTB sales does however increase 
the aggregate welfare of low-income households if it continues 
to induce low-wealth households to exercise RTB but discour- 
ages middle-wealth households from doing so. This can only hap- 
pen if the quality of council houses is sufficiently high as to 
induce middle-wealth households to exercise RTB, which is the 
case where the average quality of council housing is higher than 
max { ηm , ηl }. In such circumstances, a middle-wealth tenant might 
try to exercise RTB and to rent out the property to a low-wealth 
private tenant. But, as demonstrated in the previous section, the 
gains to exercising RTB are higher for a low-wealth council ten- 
ant than a middle-wealth tenant. Hence, as the discount on the 
sale price is reduced relative to the rent subsidy, it is middle- 
wealth tenants on the margin of the incentive to exercise RTB 
who are likely to cease to exercise RTB (perhaps considering other 
strategies such as moving into higher quality private rentals). This 
change in behavior shifts the social welfare beneﬁts of the policy 
towards low-wealth households and hence increases the aggregate 
utility of low-wealth households, whether or not they choose to 
buy or subsequently seek a council house. 
The results of reducing discounts on RTB houses are summa- 
rized in the following proposition, the proof of which is provided 
in Appendix B.2 . 
Proposition 2. Reducing the discount on RTB sales improves the ag- 
gregate welfare of low-income households if and only if the RTB 
houses are of high enough quality to attract both low- and middle- 
wealth purchasers with no reduction but attract only low-wealth pur- 
chasers with the reduction in discount, which works if and only if the 
quality of RTB houses is above max 
{
ηl , ηm , ηl τ
}
but below ηm τ , where 
ηl and ηm solve Eq. (10) , and ηl τ and η
m 
τ solve: 
u (Y H − Rηl τ + τT , η
l 
τ , 1) − u (Y 
H − R, 1 , 0) − rF Cηl τ
u (Y L − Rηl τ + τT , η
l 
τ , 1) − u (Y L − Rη
l 
τ + T , η
l 
τ , 0) − rF Cη
l 
τ
= 1 −
1 + r 
λl 
;
u (Y H − Rηm τ + τT , η
m 
τ , 1) − u (Y 
H − R, 1 , 0) − rF Cηm τ
u (Y L − Rηm τ + τT , η
m 
τ , 1) − u (Y L − R, 1 , 0) − rF Cη
m 
τ
= 1 −
1 + r 
λm 
. 
(11) 
4.2. Loosening resale restrictions 
A second policy reform to consider is to loosen the resale re- 
striction on RTB houses such that RTB purchasers can resell their 
properties in the open market. Again, the welfare effect of such a 
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policy depends on several factors: the income of RTB purchasers, 
the quality of RTB houses, and the rent subsidies on council hous- 
ing provided by the central government. In this section, we con- 
sider loosening resale restrictions in the form that a RTB purchaser 
has to return a fraction θ of the discount on the original RTB sale 
to the local authority if he or she resells the house and moves to a 
private property, where θ ∈ [0, 1]. The local authority then uses 
this returned discount to subsidize new council tenants or RTB 
purchasers. 
First, loosening resale restrictions has no effect on purchasers of 
high quality RTB houses. By Proposition 1 , RTB houses attract both 
low- and middle-wealth purchasers if the quality is higher than 
max { ηl , ηm }. Council tenants who exercise RTB on these high qual- 
ity council houses prefer living in their owned RTB properties to 
renting private houses even if they receive the high income in the 
subsequent periods. Hence, when the local authorities loosen the 
resale restrictions on RTB houses of quality higher than max { ηl , 
ηm }, both low- or middle-wealth RTB homeowners would rather 
live in their owned RTB houses than resell their RTB houses in the 
open market even if they can retain the full amount of housing 
subsidies after the resale. Thus, loosening resale restrictions has no 
effect on RTB houses of quality higher than max { ηl , ηm }. 
Second, RTB houses of quality lower than ηl that attract no 
purchaser stay unsold under looser resale restrictions. A RTB pur- 
chaser has to pay a ﬁxed cost (in utility) of owning a house, hence 
a household is uninterested in exercising RTB when his or her gain 
from owning the RTB house is not enough to cover the cost of 
purchasing the house. When the quality of council housing is suf- 
ﬁciently low, a low-wealth household is unable to obtain a large 
enough gain from living in an owned RTB house in low-income 
periods to outweigh the ﬁxed cost of purchasing the house. There- 
fore, even though resale restrictions are loosened, middle-wealth 
RTB purchasers are unable to ﬁnd a buyer among low-wealth ten- 
ants. It is also suboptimal to exercise RTB on a low-quality house 
and then resell it back to the local authority in order simply to 
obtain the price subsidy (discount) from the central government. 
Third, loosening resale restrictions may affect the propensity to 
exercise RTB for council tenants in houses of quality higher than 
ηl but lower than ηm . This depends on the discount that can be 
retained from a RTB resale, deﬁned as τ (1 − θ ) , where τ is the 
discount provided on RTB sales, 1 − θ is the fraction of the origi- 
nal discount that can be retained after a resale, τ ≥ 0, and θ ∈ [0, 
1]. By Proposition 1 , with resale restrictions, middle-wealth house- 
holds are not interested in RTB houses of quality higher than ηl 
but below ηm . When the resale restriction is lifted, middle-wealth 
households become interested in purchasing these RTB houses in 
order to resell them to low-wealth households if they are able to 
keep a large amount of the discount after resale. It happens if and 
only if the discount that is retained after resale τ (1 − θ ) is larger 
than D , where D solves: 
u (Y H − R + DT , 1 , 1) − u (Y H − R, 1 , 0) − rF C 
u (Y L − R + DT , 1 , 1) − u (Y L − R, 1 , 0) − rF C 
= 1 −
1 + r 
λm 
. (12) 
However, when the discount on RTB houses is set such that the 
optimal rent subsidies in the original council housing rental sys- 
tem are satisﬁed, that is, τ = 1 , both low- or middle-wealth RTB 
homeowners would rather live in their owned RTB houses than re- 
sell their RTB houses in the open market even if they can retain 
the full amount of housing subsidies after the resale, and hence, 
loosening resale restrictions has no effect on RTB houses. The re- 
sults of loosening resale restrictions on RTB houses are summa- 
rized in the following proposition, the proof of which is provided 
in Appendix B.3 . 
Proposition 3. When the discount on RTB houses equals the optimal 
rent subsidy, loosening resale restrictions has no effect on RTB sales. 
4.3. RTB with new construction 
Until now, we assumed no new council housing is constructed 
using the receipts of RTB. This accords with the evidence presented 
in the discussion in Section 1 and the evidence in Chart 3. In this 
subsection, we investigate how social welfare changes if the lo- 
cal authorities use the proceeds of high quality RTB sales to con- 
struct new council houses. This is done within a balanced budget 
setting; whereby the authorities are able to reduce discounts on 
RTB sales but increase the number of council properties within the 
ﬁxed budget on council housing, B . 
We focus on high quality RTB housing in our investigation here. 
As shown in the results of the previous subsection, reducing the 
discount on RTB sales of high quality RTB houses cannot help to 
reduce the number of low-income tenants on the waiting list for 
council housing. Both low- and middle-wealth council tenants ex- 
ercise RTB either with or without the reduction in discount on 
houses of quality higher than max 
{
ηl , ηm , ηl τ , η
m 
τ
}
, where ηl and 
ηm solve Eq. (10) , and ηl τ and η
m 
τ solve Eq. (11) . We will explore in 
the following analysis whether using the proceeds from RTB sales 
to replace part of the council housing stock improve the aggregate 
welfare of low-income households and how this change in welfare 
depends on the average quality of council houses. 
When the quality of RTB houses is high enough to attract 
middle-wealth purchasers despite the reduced discount on sales, 
local authorities can improve the aggregate welfare of low-income 
tenants by using the proceeds from RTB sales to construct new 
council houses for future low-income tenants or low-wealth RTB 
purchasers. The proceeds from RTB sales increase when the dis- 
count given on RTB houses decreases. The problem becomes 
whether the local authorities can improve the welfare of low- 
income households within their budget by reducing the discount 
on RTB houses and using the proceeds to construct new council 
housing for low-income applicants who have to rent privately and 
are currently on the council-house waiting list. 
In order to prioritize housing for low-wealth households, the 
quality of new council housing constructed by using RTB proceeds 
should be low. Otherwise, middle-wealth council tenants continue 
to exercise RTB and hence reduce the stock of newly-constructed 
council housing. Thus, the local authorities have to construct new 
council houses of sufficiently low quality in order to attract either 
low-wealth RTB purchasers or no purchaser at all. The results of 
the new construction reﬁnement of the RTB policy are summa- 
rized in the following proposition, the proof of which is provided 
in Appendix B.4 . 
Proposition 4. Using the proceeds from reduced-discount sales of 
RTB houses of quality higher than max 
{
ηl , ηm , ηl τ , η
m 
τ
}
to construct 
new RTB houses for wait-list applicants improves the aggregate wel- 
fare of low-income households if and only if the quality of newly 
constructed council houses is above ˜ ηl but below ˜ ηm if ˜ ηl < ˜  ηm , 
and below ˜ ηl otherwise, where ηl and ηm solve Eq. (10) , ηl τ and 
ηm τ solve Eq. (11) , and ˜ ηl and ˜ ηm solve Eq. (11) with T replaced by ˜ T ≡ (1 −λl )N l + (1 −λl )N m 
λl ( 1 −λl ) N l + λm ( 1 −λl ) N m 
(1 − τ ) T . 
The idea that the social welfare could be improved by replac- 
ing RTB sales with low quality public housing is not new. The re- 
vised RTB policy in 2012 increased the availability of funds from 
RTB sales to local councils in order to allow them to construct new 
properties. The government’s requirement was that the funds be 
used to replace the sold-by-RTB houses one for one, but at lower 
quality. The implication of our examination of the new construc- 
tion reﬁnement of RTB provides some evidence in support of this 
revised government policy. 
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4.4. Replacing RTB with rent subsidies in cash 
Replacing the RTB with rent subsidies in cash may be another 
alternative to improve the aggregate welfare of low-income house- 
holds. Initially, we consider the setting where local authorities pro- 
vide low-income tenants with council houses of lower quality than 
equivalently-sized privately-owned properties. Instead of providing 
council housing of lower quality to low-income tenants, the lo- 
cal authorities can provide them with housing subsidies in cash to 
rent private houses. Then low-income tenants receive the housing 
subsidies equal to T each period to rent private houses. Whether 
low-income tenants who receive rent subsidies obtain higher util- 
ity from renting high-quality private houses than lower-quality 
council ones depends on the housing budget from the central gov- 
ernment. The optimal council housing rental policy and its impact 
on the aggregate welfare of low-income households are summa- 
rized in the following proposition (detailed proofs are provided in 
Appendix 5 ). 
Proposition 5. It is optimal for the local authorities to provide low- 
income tenants with rent subsidies in cash instead of council houses 
of lower quality than private ones if and only if the amount of housing 
subsidies is no less than Y H − Y L per low-income tenant. 
When local authorities provide rent subsidies in cash instead 
of low-quality council housing to low-income tenants, in order to 
improve their welfare to the same level, low-income households 
have to be over-subsidized as if they receive the high income. 
In reality the quality of council houses is lower than the private 
sector, and low-wealth households are prepared to live in lower 
quality houses, hence it is hard to improve the aggregate welfare 
of low-wealth households by replacing council houses with cash 
subsidies. The budget on housing received from the central govern- 
ment is limited. It is not feasible to subsidize low-income tenants 
with large rent subsidies in cash such that their incomes are no 
less than high-income households. Thus, it is optimal for the local 
authorities to provide both housing subsidies and council houses of 
lower quality than private ones to low-income tenants instead of 
offering them only rent subsidies in cash. Replacing the RTB with 
rent subsidies in cash alone cannot improve the aggregate welfare 
of low-income households under these assumptions. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has provided what we believe to be the ﬁrst analysis 
from a theoretical perspective of the innovative national ‘Right to 
Buy’ (RTB) policy for selling public housing to public tenants in the 
UK. The policy was the largest single privatization in the period 
from 1980 to the mid-20 0 0s, raising considerable sums for central 
government and increasing the share of owner occupation in the 
UK by almost 15 percentage points. Having described the growth 
and original rationale for public housing, the paper examines the 
development and evolution of the RTB policy over time, and its 
implications for the stock of public (council) housing. 
To provide a theoretical underpinning for policy evaluation, the 
model assumed that council tenants – and therefore potential RTB 
purchasers – are heterogeneous, and that some of their character- 
istics, such as wealth and future incomes, are unobservable to local 
authorities (council house suppliers). The policy tools available to 
the local authority are the interrelated decisions (within a ﬁxed 
construction budget) of what quality of council houses to con- 
struct and whether to house all applicants for council-house ten- 
ancy or to create a waiting list for council houses, which thereby 
reveals more information about potential tenants under consider- 
ation, but at the cost of being unable to house all deserving ap- 
plicants. Crucially, we demonstrate that the RTB policy itself may 
affect the subsequent composition of applicants for council houses 
and therefore the composition of residual council tenants as some 
tenants choose to exercise their preference for RTB. 
As in standard housing tenure models, the decision of council 
tenants to exercise RTB (and to retain ownership of the property 
having exercised their RTB) hinges on the household’s preference 
for ownership over renting. However additional factors speciﬁc to 
the policy context are the average quality of RTB properties, a pol- 
icy decision of the local authority as described above, and the mag- 
nitude of the discount given to would-be RTB purchasers. We ex- 
plore the implications of these parameters on the household’s de- 
cision to exercise RTB, and on the evolving composition of tenants 
in the public sector versus owners. We use empirical data to con- 
ﬁrm some of these ﬁndings. 
We then considered four potential reforms of the RTB program: 
reducing discount on RTB sales, loosening resale restrictions, al- 
lowing local authorities to retain RTB receipts for new construc- 
tion, and brieﬂy discussing the issue of replacing council houses 
by rent subsidies in cash. We demonstrate that whether these poli- 
cies have any impact on RTB decisions hinges crucially on assump- 
tions concerning the parameters described above. For example, re- 
sale restrictions will only affect behavior where council houses are 
of intermediate quality. Conversely, reducing discounts only affects 
behavior when council houses are of ‘high’ quality. If the planner’s 
social welfare function is intended to maximise the aggregate wel- 
fare of current and future low-wealth households who would oth- 
erwise be denied access to the private market, the implications of 
council house quality are quite different in these two policy sce- 
narios. In similar vein, we suggest that returning receipts from RTB 
sales to local authorities (a reform constantly suggested by crit- 
ics of the policy) is most effective with the proviso that receipts 
are used primarily and explicitly to subsidize constructions of low- 
quality (‘affordable’) houses. It is of interest to note that this last 
policy reﬁnement was introduced recently. 
Although we believe that this paper makes progress in evaluat- 
ing the RTB policy, we have had to make key assumptions about 
the parameters of the program – for example as to the relation 
between the discount rate on RTB sales and the rent subsidy. This 
gives the policy a great coherence in theory than in practice, since 
there is little evidence of co-ordination of public housing policy 
between central government and local authorities in the UK in 
practice. Any overall evaluation of the policy would therefore also 
require further investigation of the dynamics of the relationship 
between central and local government in the UK – which is a task 
for a separate paper. 
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Appendix A. Charts and tables 
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Appendix B. Proofs of Propositions 
B1. Proof of Proposition 1 
High-income RTB tenants who prefer high-quality private 
houses are able to rent out their properties to low-income tenants 
who always prefer renting RTB houses to private houses: 
u (Y L − R, 1 , 0) − u (Y L − Rη, η, 0) 
= 
∫ 1 
η
(
−Ru C (Y 
L − Rx, x, 0) + u H (Y 
L − Rx, x, 0) 
)
dx 
< 
∫ 1 
η
(
−Ru C (Y 
L − Rx + T , x, 0) + u H (Y 
L − Rx + T , x, 0) 
)
dx 
< 
∫ 1 
η
(
−Ru C (Y 
L − Rη + T , η, 0) + u H (Y 
L − Rη + T , η, 0) 
)
dx = 0 , 
where the ﬁrst inequality comes from −Ru CC + u HC > 0 and 
the second inequality comes from R 2 u CC − Ru CH − Ru HC + u HH < 0 . 
Thus, high-income RTB homeowners are always able to rent out 
their RTB houses to low-income tenants who are unable to obtain 
council housing from the local authorities, and hence their util- 
ity in high-income periods before paying the cost of owning RTB 
houses is bounded by u (Y H − R + T , 1 , 0) when they rent privately. 
At equilibrium, a low-income council tenant exercises the RTB 
if and only if the value of exercising RTB, V i 
RT B , is larger than the 
value of continuing as a tenant, V i 
T , i ∈ { m, l }. The difference in 
the value of exercising the RTB and continuing as a tenant for a 
middle-wealth ( i = m ) or low-wealth ( i = l) council tenants is: 
r 
(
V i RT B −V 
i 
T 
)
= −rF Cη + 
λi 
1 + r 
max 
{
u (Y H − Rη + T , η, 1) , u (Y H 
−R + T , 1 , 0) } + 
(
1 −
λi 
1 + r 
)(
u (Y L − Rη + T , η, 1) 
−γ
(
u (Y L − Rη + T , η, 0) − u (Y L − R, 1 , 0) 
))
−
λi 
1 + r 
u (Y H − R, 1 , 0) −
(
1 −
λi 
1 + r 
)
u (Y L − R, 1 , 0) . 
Since −Ru CC + u HC > 0 , living in a higher quality RTB house rel- 
ative to renting it increases a high-income owner’s utility by a 
larger amount than a low-income owner. Also, as R 2 u CC − Ru CH −
Ru HC + u HH < 0 , low-income tenants’ marginal utility with respect 
to housing quality is larger than the marginal cost in utility of 
owning a house, as stated in Eq. (5) in Assumption 1. Thus, we 
have: 
−Ru C (Y 
H − Rη + T , η, 1) + u H (Y 
H − Rη + T , η, 1) − rF C 
> − Ru C (Y 
L − Rη + T , η, 1) + u H (Y 
L − Rη + T , η, 1) − rF C > 0 . 
Then living in an owned RTB house improves the utility of a coun- 
cil tenant who receives the low income if and only if the quality 
of the RTB house is larger than η, where η solves: 
u (Y L − R η + T , η, 1) − u (Y L − R η + T , η, 0) = rF C η. 
High-income RTB homeowners obtain higher utility than high- 
income private tenants by renting out their properties to low- 
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income tenants if and only if the RTB houses are of quality below 
u (Y H −R + T, 1 , 0) −u (Y H −R, 1 , 0) 
rF C . Hence both middle- and low-wealth coun- 
cil tenants exercise the RTB when the quality of the RTB houses is 
within ( η, u (Y 
H −R + T, 1 , 0) −u (Y H −R, 1 , 0) 
rF C ) . And high-income RTB home- 
owners rent out their properties to low-income tenants and rent 
higher quality private housing if and only if the RTB houses are of 
quality below ̂ η, where: 
u (Y H − R ̂  η + T , ̂  η, 1) − u (Y H − R + T , 1 , 0) = 0 . 
However, since −Ru CC + u HC > 0 , when RTB houses are of qual- 
ity below ̂ η, low-income RTB homeowners prefer renting private 
houses to living in owned RTB houses. They would not purchase 
the RTB houses of quality below ̂ η in the ﬁrst place. Thus, η > ̂  η.
The RTB houses which attract RTB purchasers to live in owned 
RTB houses rather than rent out their properties in the open mar- 
ket are of relatively high quality such that the RTB homeowners 
would rather live in the houses even if they receive the high in- 
come in the future. Therefore, RTB homeowners continue living in 
their owned properties after exercising the RTB. 
On contrast, when the quality of council housing is larger 
than η¯ such that high-income households also generate higher 
utility living in owned RTB houses compared to renting council 
houses, both middle- or low-wealth council tenants exercise the 
RTB, where η¯ solves: 
u (Y H − R ¯η + T , η¯, 1) − u (Y H − R, 1 , 0) = rF C ¯η. 
Take the ﬁrst derivatives of the difference in the values between 
exercising the RTB and continuing as a tenant with respect to η
and T , respectively, we have: 
∂ 
∂η
r 
(
V i RT B −V 
i 
T 
)
= 
(
1 −
λi 
1 + r 
)(
−Ru C (Y 
L − Rη + T , η, 1) 
+ u H (Y 
L − Rη + T , η, 1) 
)
−rF C + 
λi 
1 + r 
(
−Ru C (Y 
H − Rη + T , η, 1) 
+ u H (Y 
H − Rη + T , η, 1) 
)
> 0 ;
∂ 
∂T 
r 
(
V i RT B −V 
i 
T 
)
= 
(
1 −
λi 
1 + r 
)(
u C (Y 
L − Rη + T , η, 1) 
−γ u C (Y 
L − Rη + T , η, 0) 
)
+ 
λi 
1 + r 
u C (Y 
H − Rη + T , η, 1) > 0 . 
Then r 
(
V i 
RT B −V 
i 
R 
)
is strictly increasing in either the housing qual- 
ity, η, or the housing subsidies (or transfer payment) from the cen- 
tral government, T . Since low-wealth households have higher prob- 
ability of receiving the low income than middle-wealth households 
do ( 1 − λl > 1 − λm ), low-wealth council tenants have higher value 
of exercising low quality RTB houses than middle-wealth council 
tenants. Thus, the RTB houses of quality higher than ηl attracts 
low-wealth council tenants, where ηl solves: 
u (Y H − Rηl + T , ηl , 1) − u (Y H − R, 1 , 0) − rF Cηl 
u (Y L − Rηl + T , ηl , 1) − u (Y L − Rηl + T , ηl , 0) − rF Cηl 
= 1 −
1 + r 
λl 
. 
Low-income RTB homeowners prefer living in their RTB houses of 
quality above ηl , hence they do not rent out their properties when 
they receive the high income, otherwise, they rent out their prop- 
erties when receiving the low income also, which is a contradic- 
tion. Thus, ηl > ̂  η. When low-wealth council tenants exercise the 
RTB, the stock of council houses in the local authorities’ hand de- 
creases over time. Middle-wealth council tenants foresee the de- 
crease in possibility to obtain council housing in the future and are 
interested in exercising the RTB when they prefer owning the RTB 
houses to continuing as private tenants. Then middle-wealth coun- 
cil tenants are interested in exercising the RTB when the council 
housing quality is above max { ηl , ηm }, where ηm solves: 
u (Y H − Rηm + T , ηm , 1) − u (Y H − R, 1 , 0) − rF Cηm 
u (Y L − Rηm + T , ηm , 1) − u (Y L − R, 1 , 0) − rF Cηm 
= 1 −
1 + r 
λm 
. 
They also continue to live in their RTB properties when they re- 
ceive the high income. No tenant is interested in exercising the 
RTB if the quality of the houses is below ηl , which are left for 
future low-income council tenants. Thus, when the council hous- 
ing is of quality higher than max { ηl , ηm }, both middle- and low- 
wealth council tenants exercise the RTB and continue living in 
their RTB properties thereafter; when the quality is within the 
range ( ηl , max { ηl , ηm }), only low-wealth council tenants exercise 
the RTB and continue living in their RTB properties thereafter; no 
council tenant is interested in the RTB houses of quality below ηl . 
Therefore, the aggregate per-period welfare of low-income house- 
holds under the RTB relative to renting private houses is: ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
X 
(
1 − λl 
)
W RT B , if max 
{
ηl , ηm 
}
> η > ηl ;
X 
(
1 − λl −
(
λm − λl 
)
×( 1 − λm ) 
N m 
X 
)
W RT B , if η > max 
{
ηl , ηm 
}
. 
where X is the measure of either middle- or low-wealth low- 
income households hence X = 
(
1 − λl 
)
N l + ( 1 − λm ) N m , and the 
increment in a low-income household’s utility from living in an 
owned RTB house of quality η, η < 1, to renting a private house of 
quality one is: 
rW RT B = u (Y 
L − Rη + T , η, 1) − rF Cη − u (Y L − R, 1 , 0) . 
When the quality of RTB houses is extremely low (below ηl ) such 
that no council tenant exercises the RTB, there is no change in 
the aggregate welfare of low-income households. When the qual- 
ity of RTB houses is above ηl , the RTB improve the aggregate wel- 
fare of low-income households if and only if the welfare gain of 
low-income RTB homeowners outweighs the welfare loss of low- 
income tenants not being able to get council houses from the lo- 
cal authorities. With W deﬁned as the increase in a low-income 
council tenant’s utility relative to renting a private house, as stated 
in Eq. (8) , the RTB improves the aggregate welfare of the low- 
income households if and only if the following inequalities are sat- 
isﬁed: ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
W RT B −W 
W 
> 
λl 
1 − λl 
, if max 
{
ηl , ηm 
}
> η > ηl ;
W RT B −W 
W 
> 
λl 
(
1 − λl 
)
N l + λm ( 1 − λm ) N m (
1 − λl 
)2 
N l + ( 1 − λm ) 
2 
N m 
, if η > max 
{
ηl , ηm 
}
;
where the difference in the improvement of low-income house- 
holds’ utility generated from living in owned RTB houses relative 
to renting council houses from the local authorities is: 
r ( W RT B −W ) = u (Y 
L − Rη + T , η, 1) 
−u (Y L − Rη + T , η, 0) − rF Cη. 
Because low-wealth households have almost zero probability of re- 
ceiving the high income in the future, λl is close to zero, introduc- 
ing the RTB to houses of quality lower than max { ηl , ηm } improves 
the aggregate welfare of low-income households; but introducing 
the RTB to higher quality council houses may decrease the aggre- 
gate welfare of the low-income households since middle-wealth 
households who have higher probability of receiving the high in- 
come in the future are also interested in exercising RTB and occupy 
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the RTB houses thereafter. The council houses left for future coun- 
cil tenants are of quality below ηl , in which case no council tenant 
is interested in exercising RTB. 
B2. Proof of Proposition 2 
By Proposition 1 , low-wealth council tenants exercise RTB on 
houses of quality higher than ηl ; and when low-wealth council 
tenants exercise RTB, middle-wealth council tenants foresee the 
decrease in possibility to obtain council housing in the future and 
are interested in exercising RTB when they prefer living in owned 
RTB houses to renting private houses and hence exercise RTB on 
houses of quality above max { ηl , ηm }, where ηl and ηm satisfy 
Eq. (10) . 
With the reduced discount on RTB sales, the local authorities 
provide a fraction τ of the price subsidies to RTB homeowners, 
then low-wealth council tenants are interested in exercising RTB 
on houses of quality higher than ηl τ , where η
l 
τ solves: 
u (Y H − Rηl τ + τT , η
l 
τ , 1) − u (Y 
H − R, 1 , 0) − rF Cηl τ
u (Y L − Rηl τ + τT , η
l 
τ , 1) − u (Y L − Rη
l 
τ + T , η
l 
τ , 0) − rF Cη
l 
τ
= 1 −
1 + r 
λl 
. 
When low-wealth council tenants exercise RTB, middle-wealth 
council tenants foresee the decrease in possibility to obtain council 
housing in the future and exercise RTB when the council housing 
quality is above max 
{
ηl τ , η
m 
τ
}
, where ηm τ solves: 
u (Y H − Rηm τ + τT , η
m 
τ , 1) − u (Y 
H − R, 1 , 0) − rF Cηm τ
u (Y L − Rηm τ + τT , η
m 
τ , 1) − u (Y L − R, 1 , 0) − rF Cη
m 
τ
= 1 −
1 + r 
λm 
. 
Then the cutoff quality of RTB houses above which low- or middle- 
wealth council tenants exercise RTB decreases with the fraction of 
housing subsidies from the central government that RTB home- 
owners retain ( τ ), which increases in the discount on RTB sales, 
because: 
dηl τ
dτ
= −
(
1 + r − λl 
λl 
(
−Ru C (Y 
L − Rηl τ + τT , η
l 
τ , 1) 
+ u H (Y 
L − Rηl τ + τT , η
l 
τ , 1) − rF C 
)
+ 
(
−Ru C (Y 
H − Rηl τ + τT , η
l 
τ , 1) 
+ u H (Y 
H − Rηl τ + τT , η
l 
τ , 1) − rF C 
))
−1 
·
(
1 + r − λl 
λl 
u C (Y 
L − Rηl τ + τT , η
l 
τ , 1) 
+ u C (Y 
H − Rηl τ + τT , η
l 
τ , 1) 
)
T < 0 ;
dηm τ
dτ
= −
(
1 + r − λm 
λm 
(
−Ru C (Y 
L − Rηm τ + τT , η
m 
τ , 1) 
+ u H (Y 
L − Rηm τ + τT , η
m 
τ , 1) − rF C 
)
+ 
(
−Ru C (Y 
H − Rηm τ + τT , η
m 
τ , 1) 
+ u H (Y 
H − Rηm τ + τT , η
m 
τ , 1) − rF C 
))−1 
·
(
1 + r − λm 
λm 
u C (Y 
L − Rηm τ + τT , η
m 
τ , 1) 
+ u C (Y 
H − Rηm τ + τT , η
m 
τ , 1) 
)
T < 0 . 
Thus, reducing the discount on RTB sales (a decrease in τ ) in- 
creases the quality of RTB houses above which either low- or 
middle-wealth council tenants are interested in owning. Also, the 
difference in the improvement of low-income households’ utility 
generated from living in owned RTB houses relative to renting 
council houses from the local authorities is: 
r ( W RT B −W ) = u (Y 
L − Rη + τT , η, 1) 
−u (Y L − Rη + T , η, 0) − rF Cη, 
which decreases with the reduction in the discount on RTB sales. 
Thus, reducing the discount on RTB sales improve aggregate wel- 
fare of low-income households if and only if the quality of RTB 
houses is above max { ηl , ηm } such that both low- and middle- 
wealth council tenants are interested in exercising RTB without the 
reduction but attract only low-wealth purchasers with the reduc- 
tion, that is, above ηl τ and below η
m 
τ . 
B3. Proof of Proposition 3 
When the discount on RTB houses is set such that the optimal 
rent subsidy in the original council housing rental system is sat- 
isﬁed, at equilibrium, the quality of council houses optimizes low- 
income tenants’ utility. Then without the adjustment cost of own- 
ing houses, low-income RTB homeowners always prefer living in 
their owned RTB properties to renting private houses, that is: 
u (Y L − Rη + T , η, 1) > u (Y L − Rη + T , η, 0) ≥ u (Y L − R + T , 1 , 0) . 
Since −Ru CC + u HC > 0 , high-income households generate higher 
utility owning relative to renting houses than low-income house- 
holds. RTB homeowners prefer continuing living in their RTB prop- 
erties to renting private houses even if they are able to retain the 
housing beneﬁt by either renting out or reselling their properties. 
Thus: 
u (Y H − Rη + T , η, 1) > u (Y H − R + T , 1 , 0) . 
Therefore, it is optimal for RTB homeowners who have exercised 
RTB to continue living in their owned properties even if they re- 
ceive the high income in the future. The difference in the value of 
exercising the RTB and continuing as a tenant for a middle-wealth 
( i = m ) or low-wealth ( i = l) council tenant becomes: 
r 
(
V i RT B −V 
i 
T 
)
= −rF Cη + 
λi 
1 + r 
(
u (Y H − Rη + T , η, 1) 
−u (Y H − R, 1 , 0) 
)
+ 
(
1 −
λi 
1 + r 
)(
u (Y L − Rη + T , η, 1) 
−I [ i = l ] u (Y 
L − Rη + T , η, 0) − I [ i = m ] u (Y 
L − R, 1 , 0) 
)
. 
By Proposition 1 , RTB houses of quality higher than ηl are occu- 
pied at equilibrium. The homeowners are uninterested in reselling 
their properties even if they receive the high income in the future. 
Without resale restrictions, the beneﬁt of exercising RTB on houses 
of quality lower than ηl is still not enough to cover the adjustment 
cost of owning houses, and hence no council tenant purchase RTB 
houses of quality below ηl . Thus, loosening resale restrictions on 
RTB houses of any quality has no effect on the aggregate welfare 
of low-income households under the RTB policy that is consistent 
with the optimal rent subsidy. 
B4. Proof of Proposition 4 
When using the proceeds from the reduced discount on RTB 
sales to construct new council houses, the local authorities pro- 
vide a fraction τ of the housing subsidies to RTB homeowners, 
and the rest 1 − τ fraction of the housing subsidies are transferred 
to new low-income tenants or new RTB purchasers. The proceeds 
from RTB sales is (1 − τ ) T X, where X = 
(
1 − λl 
)
N l + ( 1 − λm ) N m . 
The measure of future low-income tenants is λl 
(
1 − λl 
)
N l + 
λm ( 1 − λm ) N m . Thus, the housing subsidy that can be provided to 
each low-income tenant is: 
˜ T = 
(
1 − λl 
)
N l + ( 1 − λm ) N m 
λl 
(
1 − λl 
)
N l + λm ( 1 − λm ) N m 
(1 − τ ) T . 
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Then by Proposition 1 , low-wealth council tenants are interested 
in exercising RTB on houses of quality higher than ˜ ηl , and middle- 
wealth council tenants foresee the decrease in possibility to obtain 
council housing in the future and exercise RTB when the coun- 
cil housing quality is above max 
{˜ ηl , ˜  ηm }, where ˜ ηl and ˜ ηm solve 
Eq. (10) with T replaced by ˜ T . Thus, in order to maximize the ag- 
gregate welfare of future low-income households, the local author- 
ities construct new council houses of quality above ˜ ηl and below ˜ ηm , if exist, for low-wealth RTB purchasers, otherwise, they con- 
struct new council houses of quality below ˜ ηl for low-income ten- 
ants who are of either low or middle wealth. 
The aggregate welfare of low-income RTB homeowners when 
the discount on a RTB sale is reduced to a fraction τ of the housing 
subsidy from the central government becomes: ((
1 − λl 
)2 
N l + 
(
1 − λl 
)2 
N m 
)
W τRT B , 
where the utility of a low-income RTB homeowner is: 
rW τRT B = u (Y 
L − Rη + τT , η, 1) − rF Cη. 
The optimal welfare of future low-income households, who are ei- 
ther RTB homeowners or council tenants, is: ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
(
1 − λl 
)(
λl 
(
1 − λl 
)
N l 
+ λm ( 1 − λm ) N m ) ˜  W RT B , if ˜ ηm > ˜  η > ˜  ηl ;(
λl 
(
1 − λl 
)
N l + λm ( 1 − λm ) N m 
)
×
u (Y L − R ˜  η + ˜  T , ˜  η, 0) 
r 
, if ˜ η < ˜  ηl ;
where the utility of a low-income homeowner of RTB house of 
quality within ( ˜  ηl , ˜  ηm ) is: 
r ˜  W RT B = u (Y 
L − R ˜  η + ˜  T , ˜  η, 1) − rF C ˜  η. 
B5. Proof of Proposition 5 
The equilibrium housing rent of private houses, stated in 
Eq. (2) , implies that the quality of private houses optimizes the 
utility of high-income tenants. Also, the optimal quality of council 
housing, η⋆ , maximizes the low-income tenants’ utility of renting 
the council houses, which solves Eq. (7) . Thus, when the housing 
subsidies per low-income tenant, T , is no less than the difference 
between the high and low income, Y H − Y L , it is optimal for the lo- 
cal authorities to provide a low-income tenant with a rent subsidy 
that equals T in cash to rent a private house. 
When T < Y H − Y L , the optimal quality of council housing that 
maximizes the low-income households’ utility of renting the coun- 
cil houses, η⋆ , is less than one (the normalized quality of private 
houses). Since R 2 u CC − Ru CH − Ru HC + u HH < 0 , we have −Ru C + 
u H > 0 for any quality level of council housing that is higher than 
the optimal one, η⋆ . Then the utility of low-income tenants ob- 
tained from renting council houses of quality higher than the opti- 
mum is lower than u (Y L − Rη⋆ + T , η⋆ , 0) . Thus, after receiving the 
housing subsidy, T , a low-income tenant obtains higher utility from 
renting a council house of quality η⋆ , where η⋆ < 1, than renting a 
private house of quality one. That is: 
u (Y L − R + T , 1 , 0) < u (Y L − Rη + T , η, 0) . 
Therefore, when the budget on housing is limited such that T < 
Y H − Y L , it is optimal for the local authorities to provide both a 
housing subsidy, T , and a rented council house of quality, η⋆ , which 
is lower than private-housing quality, to a low-income tenant. 
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